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Aging Judges
FRANCIS X. SHEN*
America’s judiciary is aging. The average age of federal judges is sixtynine years old, older than it has been at any other time in the country’s
history. The typical reaction to this demographic shift is concern that
aging judges will serve past their prime. Scholars have thus offered
proposals for mandatory judicial retirement, judicial term limits, and
mechanisms for judicial removal. In this Article, I critique such
proposals and draw on cognitive neuroscience to argue that rather than
forcing their retirement, we should empower aging judges.
The central neuroscientific insight is that individual brains age
differently. While at the population level, age generally leads to
reductions in information processing speed, and for some, serious
deficits in memory and decision-making capacity, there is much
individual variation.
Given individual differences in how aging affects cognitive decline, the
current system—which mandates intense health scrutiny when a judge
is younger, followed by no formal cognitive evaluation for the rest of
the judge’s career—can be improved. I argue that we can empower
judges by providing them opportunities for confidential, accurate, and
thorough cognitive assessments at regular intervals throughout their
judicial careers.
If carefully developed and implemented so as to avoid politicization and
to ensure complete confidentiality of results, individualized judicial
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cognitive health assessments will allow judges to make more informed
decisions about when and how to modify their service on the bench.
More individualized assessment will allow the legal system to retain the
wisdom of experienced judges, while avoiding the injustice that comes
with handing over the courtroom to a judge who is no longer capable
of running it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The people . . . have a legitimate, indeed compelling, interest in
maintaining a judiciary fully capable of performing the demanding
tasks that judges must perform. It is an unfortunate fact of life that
physical and mental capacity sometimes diminish with age. The people
may therefore wish to replace some older judges. Voluntary retirement
will not always be sufficient.
–Justice Sandra Day O’Connor1
The average age of America’s federal judges is sixty-nine years old—older
than it has been at any other time in the country’s history.2 On the United States
Supreme Court, in addition to Justice Ginsburg, who is eighty-six years old,
Stephen Breyer is eighty-one, and Clarence Thomas is seventy-one.3 In the
lower courts, there are eleven federal judges over the age of ninety who still hear
cases.4 Concerns about aging judges have reignited the long-running interest in
implementing term limits, mandatory retirement ages, and forced removal for
federal judges.5
1 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472 (1991) (citations omitted).
2 See discussion infra Part II.A.
3 Current Members, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biograph

ies.aspx [https://perma.cc/UK9X-WDJ8].
4 Life Tenure for Federal Judges Raises Issues of Senility, Dementia, PROPUBLICA
(Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.propublica.org/article/life-tenure-for-federal-judges-raisesissues-of-senility-dementia [https://perma.cc/7KP8-7WVC] [hereinafter Life Tenure for
Federal Judges].
5 Compare Daniel Hemel, What Happens if Ruth Bader Ginsburg Remains Too
Sick to Work?, P OLITICO MAG . (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2019/01/16/ruth-bader-ginsburg-supreme-court-health-224014 [https://perma.cc
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In this Article, I critique such proposals and draw on cognitive neuroscience
to argue that rather than forcing them to retire, we should empower aging judges.
The key innovation I propose is individualized, brain-based assessment of
legally relevant cognitive functioning. Drawing on recent advances in the
detection of dementia, I propose in this Article a new path forward that mandates
(1) the development of a judicial cognitive assessment tool; and (2) confidential,
individualized cognitive assessment using the tool for all judges at least every
five years. The results of the assessment would remain confidential to the judge,
and the proposal would not introduce mandatory retirement, term limits, or new
protocols for removing judges. Rather, the system is premised on empowering
judges with better data to inform their personal, private decisions about when
and how to modify their judicial workloads.
The Article also turns its attention to aging judges in state judiciaries. A
majority of states employ a mandatory judicial retirement age, but several states
have raised the retirement age in recent years.6 In upholding state mandatory
retirement ages for judges, Justice O’Connor wrote, “It is an unfortunate fact of
life that physical and mental capacity sometimes diminish with age.”7 At the
population level, age generally leads to reductions in information processing
speed, and for some, serious deficits in memory and decision-making capacity.8
But there is much individual variation. While an eighty-year-old judge is at
significantly greater risk for dementia than a fifty-year-old judge, it does not
follow that all eighty-year-old judges have diminished cognitive capacities, nor
that all fifty-year-old judges are free from dementia. Mandatory retirement
regimes conflate age with diminished judicial capacity, overlooking the wisdom
that comes with experience and the scientific reality that age is a risk factor for,
but not dispositive of, cognitive decline.
At present, neither the federal nor state judicial systems formally provide
judges with regular opportunities to assess their cognitive health. The lack of
cognitive health assessments for older judges is striking when contrasted with
the data requested of younger judges during the nomination process. The
judicial nomination process is the one time in a judge’s career when judges are
routinely required to undergo a cognitive health examination.
The United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary requires that
nominees undergo a medical exam,9 and the medical form provided to nominees
includes several items directly related to brain health. There is a long list of
conditions that may be disqualifying, and they include “progressive
/AW88-AUN6] (arguing that allowing justices to serve for life is better than other
alternatives), with Eric Segall, Why Professor Hemel Is Wrong About Life Tenure for
SCOTUS, DORF L. (Jan. 16, 2019), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2019/01/why-professorhemel-is-wrong-about-life.html [https://perma.cc/P2GD-A2PW] (supporting term limits
and mandatory retirement ages).
6 See discussion infra Part V.
7 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472 (1991) (emphasis added).
8 See discussion infra Part III.A.
9 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION—JUDICIARY [on file with author].
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neurological disorders,” “current emotional or mental instability,” and “any
other condition that is disabling or potentially disabling in the foreseeable
future.”10 Later in the form, the medical provider is instructed to check either
“Yes” or “No” in answer to the question: “Do you find any abnormal condition
or disease of . . . [the] Brain & Nervous System?”11
If the judicial nominee clears the health exam and the broader nomination
process, the judge will join the bench, enjoy life tenure, and never again be
required to undergo a brain health checkup.12 The current system—which
mandates intense scrutiny when a judge is younger, followed by zero required
follow-up as a judge ages—can be improved.
Specifically, I propose a judicial cognitive health assessment program that:
(1) mandates and funds the collection of baseline neuroimaging and
neuropsychology data at the nomination stage, and follow-up neuroimaging and
neuropsychology data in regular five-year intervals thereafter; and (2) requires
that the results of the testing remain fully confidential and private, with no
exceptions.
While the judge’s physician may make recommendations about disclosure,
in my proposed system the judge will retain power over their brain data. This is
important because it empowers judges, is less likely to become politicized, and
can be administered outside of media scrutiny.
As described in Part II, my proposal harnesses the promise, while navigating
the perils, of recent advances in dementia biomarkers. In the past two decades,
there have been “revolutionary changes in dementia research and practice, with
a growing array of imaging and fluid biomarkers taking center stage in
diagnostic evaluation and monitoring of progression.”13 Appropriate use of
these biomarkers would allow the system to more effectively identify and
anticipate judicial cognitive decline.
The Article is organized into seven parts. Part I provides context by
discussing the aging of the federal judiciary. Part II reviews the science of agerelated cognitive decline. It should be noted at the outset that “dementia” is an
umbrella term to capture multiple neurodegenerative diseases, including but not
limited to Alzheimer’s disease (AD).14 I primarily focus on AD in this Article
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See infra Part II.B.
13 Bradford C. Dickerson, Neuroimaging, Cerebrospinal Fluid Markers, and Genetic

Testing in Dementia, in DEMENTIA: COMPREHENSIVE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 528, 531
(Bradford C. Dickerson & Alireza Atri eds., 2014); see also David S. Knopman et al., The
National Institute on Aging and the Alzheimer’s Association Research Framework for
Alzheimer’s Disease: Perspectives from the Research Roundtable, 14 ALZHEIMER’S &
DEMENTIA 563, 564 (2018) (discussing the development and importance of enhanced
biomarkers).
14 ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, UNDERSTANDING ALZHEIMER’S AND DEMENTIA 2 (July 2019),
https://www.alz.org/media/Documents/understanding-alzheimers-dementia-b.pdf [https
://perma.cc/7PXB-QPST] (explaining that primary causes of dementia include Alzheimer’s
Disease, Vascular Dementia, Dementia with Lewy Bodies, and Frontotemporal Dementia).
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for illustrative purposes, but the proposed judicial cognitive health evaluation
would screen for many types of dementia.
Part III explores the formal and informal mechanisms by which the federal
system identifies and responds to judges experiencing cognitive decline. Formal
mechanisms of redress are rarely used, leaving informal mechanisms as the
primary strategy for addressing judicial cognitive decline. I argue that the
“honor system” has largely worked well but could function even better with the
addition of individualized assessment data.
Part IV reviews the states’ use of mandatory judicial retirement ages,
currently the most widely adopted solution to address the challenge of aging
judges. Given individual variation in how brains age, I argue that mandatory
retirement is an inefficient and constitutionally suspect response to age-related
judicial cognitive decline.
Having described and critiqued the existing federal and state strategies to
address judicial cognitive decline, Part V proposes the introduction of
individualized judicial cognitive assessments, including baseline and follow-up
neurological and neurocognitive testing. In establishing the core cognitive
competencies required to carry out judicial duties, the proposal draws on judicial
canons of conduct, as well as existing state and federal health questionnaires for
judicial nominees. Because my proposed solution involves the collection of
baseline and follow-up brain biomarker data, I address concerns specific to brain
data. Part VI discusses several possible implications of, and extensions to, the
proposed system. I discuss constitutionality, feasibility, and legitimacy. Part VII
concludes.

II. AMERICA’S AGING JUDICIARY
This Part briefly explores the reasons why America’s judiciary is getting
older. Part A utilizes data from the Federal Judicial Center to discuss how the
average age of judges in the federal system has increased over time. Part B
discusses the availability of “senior status” for federal judges and judges’
general hesitance to fully retire. Part C presents the available data on ages of
state judges and discusses recent trends to raise the mandatory retirement age in
several states.

A. Federal Judges Are Getting Older
The ability to extend life has led to a greater number and a greater proportion
of older adults in the United States. Based on census data, it is estimated that by
“2050, the population aged 65 and over is projected to be 83.7 million, almost
double its estimated population of 43.1 million in 2012.”15 The economic,
15 JENNIFER M. ORTMAN ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AN AGING NATION: THE OLDER
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (May 2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p25-1140.pdf [https://perma.cc/962U-BL8G].
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political, and social implications of these demographic trends have been the
subject of much analysis.16
In line with these broader demographic trends, the federal judiciary is also
getting older. Data from the Federal Judicial Center shows a steady increase in
judicial age.17 Today, the average age of Article III judges is sixty-nine years
old, the highest it has ever been.18

B. Life Tenure, Senior Status, and Retirement
The aging judiciary is, in part, the result of medical advances that allow
humans to live longer. But longer lifespans are only an enabling condition; in
many sectors, the aging population has not altered the average age of the
workers. For instance, in professional football, the average age is falling, as is
the average length of an NFL career.19 This is because NFL football players do
not enjoy job security and are readily replaced by younger players.20
To take another example from a different industry, there has not been a large
increase in the percentage of older truck drivers, even though there are no
mandatory retirement ages for truckers.21 The lack of older truck drivers is not

16 See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AGING AND THE MACROECONOMY: LONG-

TERM IMPLICATIONS OF AN OLDER POPULATION (2012) (exploring the relationship between
economics and an increasing population of aging adults); SUSAN M. HILLIER & GEORGIA M.
BARROW, AGING, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND SOCIETY (9th ed. 2011); (explaining many social
aspects of the aging process); James M. Poterba, Retirement Security in an Aging Population,
104 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing economics and retirement security for an
increasing population of aging adults); GRAYSON K. VINCENT & VICTORIA A. VELKOFF, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, THE NEXT FOUR DECADES: THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2010 TO 2050 (May 2010), https://census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/public
ations/2010/demo/p25-1138.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXE4-TWL7] (predicting shifts in the
population and demographics of aging adults).
17 Demography of Article III Judges, 1789–2017, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc
.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/age-and-experience-judges [https://perma.cc/
9ASS-MRL3]. Over the span of 1790–2017, the average age has risen from forty-nine to
sixty-nine. Id. As discussed in the text, this increase in average age is also due, in part, to the
ability of judges to take senior status while still regularly hearing cases. Id.
18 Id. It should be noted that while average age is rising, the age at appointment has
slightly decreased over the last half-century. Albert Yoon, Federal Judicial Tenure, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 70, 71 (Lee Epstein & Stefanie A.
Lindquist eds., 2017) (“[T]he average age at commission has declined, albeit modestly, from
the Truman to Obama administrations.”).
19 Kevin Clark, The NFL Has an Age Problem, RINGER (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://www.theringer.com/2016/9/7/16077250/the-nfl-has-an-age-problem-7068825845e4
[https://perma.cc/47N3-CTWZ].
20 Id.
21 Todd Dills, Shifting Age Demographics Among Truck Drivers Could Exacerbate
Driver Shortage over Next 10 Years, COM. CARRIER J. (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.ccj
digital.com/shifting-age-demographics-among-truck-drivers-could-exacerbate-driver
-shortage-over-next-10-years/ [https://perma.cc/JG6K-6976].
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because younger truck drivers are pushing them out,22 but rather because most
older truck drivers follow the pattern of older workers generally—they retire.
Although there is variation by education level, the average retirement age for
Americans is sixty-four for men and sixty-two for women.23
It is worth reflecting on this comparison for a moment. The average
retirement age for most Americans is between sixty-two and sixty-four years
old. The average age of Article III judges is sixty-nine.24 Clearly, federal judges
prefer to keep working than to retire.25
This preference was enabled by the advent of “senior status.”26 In 1919,
Congress “created the office of Senior Judge and thus enabled the federal
judiciary to continue to benefit from the service of many dedicated and
experienced judges.”27 This allows federal judges to take one of four paths:28
(1) judges can continue in active service until they die;29
(2) judges can take “senior status” at some point before death (provided they
continue to provide substantial service to the court), which allows them
to continue receiving both a salary and salary increases;30
(3) judges can “retire,” which means they receive an annual salary without
salary increases, but can re-enter private practice;31 or
(4) judges can “resign,” which allows them to enter (lucrative) private
practice, but means that all compensation ceases and there are no federal
retirement benefits.32

22 Indeed, there is a shortage of younger long-haul truck drivers. Linda Longton, The

Driver Deficit: Who Will Drive the Future?, COM. CARRIER J. (May 28, 2018),
https://www.ccjdigital.com/the-driver-deficit-who-will-drive-the-future/ [https://perma
.cc/GGK5-LVLB].
23 ALICIA H. MUNNELL, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, THE AVERAGE RETIREMENT AGE –
AN UPDATE 1 (Mar. 2015); ALICIA H. MUNNELL, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, WHAT IS THE
AVERAGE RETIREMENT AGE? 5 (Aug. 2011).
24 Demography of Article III Judges, supra note 17.
25 See Yoon, supra note 18, at 70 (discussing why federal judges stay on the bench).
26 The introduction of senior status has been described as an “ingenious” and “elegant
response” to the problem that, absent this senior status option, judges would face strong
financial incentives to remain in active status. Betty Binns Fletcher, A Response to Stras &
Scott’s Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 524 (2007).
27 Frederic Block, Senior Status: An “Active” Senior Judge Corrects Some Common
Misunderstandings, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 533, 535 (2007). It is beyond the scope of this
article, but worth noting, that there has been academic debate over the constitutionality of
the senior status statute. Compare David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges
Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453, 456 (2007), with Fletcher, supra note 26, at
524.
28 Block, supra note 27, at 536.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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Today, senior status can be claimed by any Article III judge or justice “after
meeting the age and service requirements of the ‘Rule of Eighty’—your age and
years of service must add up to eighty, you must be at least sixty-five years old,
and you must have been on the bench for at least ten years.”33 A judge who takes
senior status does not fully retire.34 Rather, “senior judges continue to perform
the same judicial duties and receive the same salary as active judges.”35 Senior
status is attractive to judges because it allows judges to continue their
professional lives36 and provides them with more control over the cases they
hear.37 Judges’ decisions to take senior status are related to the judicial pension
system,38 and the average age at which active judges take senior status has
declined over time, likely because of “changing rules for pension qualification
from seventy years (and ten years of service) to sixty-five years (and fifteen
years of service).”39
Data from the Federal Judicial Center makes clear that the vast majority of
Article III judges move to senior status, rather than to full retirement. For most
professions, one does not die on the job. Not so for federal judges. Federal
Judicial Center data shows that nearly 75% of judges leave the bench because
they die.40 As the Federal Judicial Center observes, “In recent decades, many
federal judges have assumed senior status even though eligible for full
retirement. This trend may help account for the growing proportion of judges
whose terms have ended in death rather than resignation or retirement.”41
Senior judges are presently 40% of the federal judiciary, and this number is
likely to grow.42 Federal Judicial Center data finds that from 1997 to 2015,
“senior-status judges presided over between approximately 15 and 25 percent

33 Id.
34 Block, supra note 27, at 536.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 538. (“There are three principal advantages to taking senior status: (1) it allows

the judge to continue with the judge’s coveted judicial career, the intellectual stimulation it
affords, and the judge’s commitment to public service; (2) it gives the judge the opportunity
to have more control over the quantity and quality of his or her workload, without loss of
pay, provided the judge continues to perform ‘substantial service’; and (3) it creates a
vacancy, thereby paving the way for additional judicial help for the courts.”).
37 Yoon, supra note 18, at 75 (“[Senior status judges] can elect to hear less than a full
caseload and request inclusion or exclusion from certain types of cases.”).
38 Id. at 76 (observing based on analysis of judicial tenure that “senior status has been
inextricably linked to judicial pensions”).
39 Id. at 78. Yoon’s data suggests that circuit judges tend, on average, to remain on
active status longer, while district court judges are more likely to jump to senior status as
soon as they are pension eligible. Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and
the Political Economy of Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495, 533 (2005).
40 Demography of Article III Judges, supra note 17.
41 Id.
42 Yoon, supra note 18, at 95 (“[In 2014,] senior judges comprise 40 percent of the total
number of judges. As judges live longer and as delays in judicial confirmations continue, the
ratio is likely to skew towards more senior judges.”).
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of all completed district court trials.”43 In some districts, however, that number
is greater. In the Eastern District of New York in 2007, for instance, “senior
district judges [had] on average higher caseloads than the active judges.”44
Senior judges handle many high-profile cases. For instance, in 2017, eightyyear-old Judge Nathaniel Gorton, of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, heard one of the first cases on President Trump’s travel ban.45
The case involved, in the judge’s own words, a “flurry of activity,”46 and the
opinion offered on February 3, 2017 came just a week after the Executive Order
was issued on January 27, 2017.47

C. State Judges
States differ from the federal system in how judges are selected, elected,
and retained.48 Without life tenure, in the states “the most common method of
retention is some form of election: partisan, nonpartisan, or retention.”49 The
prevalence of mandatory retirement ages, the retention machinery of elections,
and the political reappointment process mean that older state judges have more
difficult barriers to surpass than their federal counterparts if they wish to
continue serving. As a result, it stands to reason that the average age of state
judges would be lower than in the federal system.
The best available data on the age of state judges comes from law professors
Stacey George and Albert Yoon. George and Yoon lead a project called “The
Gavel Gap,” in which they investigate whether the demographics of state court
judges reflect the demographics of citizens in that state.50 They find a gap, on
race and gender dimensions, between citizens and their judges.51 The study,
which was supported by the American Constitution Society, is impressive
because it is the first to widely collect comparable judicial demographic data

43 Demography of Article III Judges, supra note 17 (figures from caseload reports of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
44 Block, supra note 27, at 540.
45 Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 30 (D. Mass. 2017).
46 Id.
47 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
48 See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE IN STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2015); Herbert M. Kritzer, Impact of
Judicial Elections on Judicial Decisions, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 353 (2016)
[hereinafter Kritzer, Impact].
49 Kritzer, Impact, supra note 48, at 356 (discussing how some states utilize
reappointment, and how the process may vary by level of the court within the state).
50 See TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW
AND POLICY, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS? 1 (Dec. 2014);
see also Exposing the Gavel Gap, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/brandstudio/goliath/exposing-the-gavel-gap/ [https://perma.cc/3TY5-Y3BK].
51 See GEORGE & YOON, supra note 50; Exposing the Gavel Gap, supra note 50.
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across the states.52 Although not the focus of their analysis, they observed birth
year data for 5378 state judges (out of 10,295 in their total dataset).53 Based on
this birth year data, they calculate average state judge age to be 59.6, with a
median age of sixty (max age of eighty-eight).54 Twenty-four percent of judges
are over age sixty-five, but only 1.4% of judges are over age seventy-five.55 This
final statistic, suggesting that 99% of judges in state courts are age seventy-five
or younger, likely reflects the effect of mandatory retirement ages and the more
rigorous judicial retention process in the states. Another contributing factor to
the differences in ages between state and federal judges is that federal judges
often serve as state judges first.
In addition, many states have mechanisms whereby a “retired” judge can be
“recalled” into service without violating the mandatory retirement statute. To
illustrate: in New Jersey, the state supreme court held that
. . . the modern State Constitution of 1947 provides for mandatory retirement
of judges, but the document is silent on the subject of recall. Nowhere does the
plain language of the Constitution forbid recall . . . [or] conflict with temporary
recall assignments because the two concepts are distinct. One prevents lifelong
tenure; the other affords judges neither tenure nor a seven-year term and does
not reverse a judge’s retirement.56

Even within mandatory retirement regimes, then, older judges may be playing
critical roles.
While at present state judges appear to be younger, on average, than their
federal counterparts, it is possible that state judges will start to serve longer as
mandatory retirement ages are raised. Currently, thirty-two states have
mandatory retirement ages for judges.57 But in several states, there are proposals
to raise the mandatory retirement age or to eliminate it altogether.58
Proponents of raising or eliminating the retirement age generally argue that
“[v]ery competent jurists are being forced to retire in the primes of their
careers.”59 Proponents also argue that states have formal processes to remove
52 I thank Professors George and Yoon for sharing with me some of their findings on

judicial age.
53 Email correspondence on file with author.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 State v. Buckner, 121 A.3d 290, 292 (N.J. 2015).
57 See FRANCIS X. SHEN, APPENDIX: TABLE OF MANDATED JUDICIAL RETIREMENT AGES
BY STATE (2020), http://www.fxshen.com/FrancisShen_Appendix_StateJudicialRetirement
Ages_FINAL.pdf [on file with the author] [hereinafter SHEN, APPENDIX]; see also discussion
in Part V.
58 One reason for resistance to these proposals may be concern about the impact on state
pensions. For instance, a judge may be concerned that a legislature would reduce judicial
pensions if they were allowed (or expected) to work later into life beyond the mandatory
retirement age.
59 Ashby Jones, A New Lease for Old Judges, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2013), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323699704578328214137916682 [https://per

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

246

[Vol. 81:2

judges on a case-by-case basis for age-related illness or cognitive impairment.
In the words of Indiana State Senator Jim Buck, “[W]e can address these
situations on a case-by-case basis . . . . We’ve got lawyers in their 80s whose
minds are steel traps. There’s no reason to cast aside that kind of legal mind.”60
Developments in the states include:








Maryland: In February 2018, a bill was proposed in the Maryland House
that would give voters an opportunity to vote on a constitutional
amendment to raise the mandatory judicial retirement age from seventy
to seventy-three.61
Florida: In November 2018, Florida voters approved a state
constitutional amendment to raise the mandatory retirement age for
Florida Supreme Court justices from seventy to seventy-five years
old.62 The amendment passed with 61.6% in favor and 38.4%
opposing.63
Michigan: In 2017, the Michigan House Judiciary Committee reintroduced and passed a measure to repeal the mandatory retirement age
of seventy years old for state judges.64 This measure was first
introduced in 2007 and has since been re-introduced three additional
times: in 2011, 2013, and 2015.65 However, this most recent attempt
represents the first successful approval from the Michigan House
Judiciary Committee.66
Alabama: In 2019, during discussion of an amendment to the State
Constitution in the House of Representatives, a proposed amendment to

ma.cc/8GHS-PYCH] (quoting Pennsylvania State Senator Stewart Greenleaf, who
sponsored a bill to eliminate the judicial retirement age).
60 Id.
61 Diane Rey, Raising Retirement for Judges from 70 to 73 Gets Another Try,
MARYLANDREPORTER.COM (Feb. 10, 2019), https://marylandreporter.com/2019/02/10/
raising-retirement-for-judges-from-70-to-73-gets-another-try/ [https://perma.cc/7LB89C4X].
62 Florida Amendment 6, Marsy’s Law Crime Victims Rights, Judicial Retirement Age,
and Judicial Interpretation of Laws and Rules Amendment (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https://
ballotpedia.org/Florida_Amendment_6,_Marsy%27s_Law_Crime_Victims_Rights,_Judi
cial_Retirement_Age,_and_Judicial_Interpretation_of_Laws_and_Rules_Amendment_(2
018) [https://perma.cc/EU8Z-D8BZ].
63 Id.
64 Michigan: Repeal of Mandatory Judicial Retirement Age Advances out of House
Committee; Would Allow Judges Older than 70 to Run for or be Appointed to Judicial Office,
GAVEL TO GAVEL (May 8, 2017), http://gaveltogavel.us/2017/05/08/michigan-repealmandatory-judicial-retirement-age-advances-house-committee-allow-judges-older-70run-appointed-judicial-office/ [https://perma.cc/2HGT-AFMZ].
65 Id.
66 Id.
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raise the judicial retirement age to seventy-five from seventy was struck
down (18 in favor, 73 against).67
New York: In 2013, the New York Mandatory Judicial Retirement Age
Amendment (Proposition 6), which would have raised the mandatory
judicial retirement age from seventy years old to eighty years old for
Supreme Court justices and Court of Appeals judges, was defeated
(39% supporting, 61% opposed).68 In addition, leaders of the New York
Reform Party sued to remove the New York judicial age limit in 2017.69
Though a filed paper indicates that a trial court in New York accepted
the filing,70 as of 2019, the New York judicial age limit of seventy years
has not been removed.71
Oregon: In 2016, the Oregon Elimination of Mandatory Judicial
Retirement Age Amendment (Measure 94), a measure that would
remove the constitutional amendment requiring mandatory retirement
of judges once they turn seventy-five years old and prevent future
legislatures from re-establishing a retirement age for judges, was
defeated (63% opposed, 37% in favor).72
Pennsylvania: In 2016, a constitutional amendment to raise the
mandatory retirement age for Pennsylvania judges from seventy to
seventy-five years old was narrowly passed (50.6% in favor, 49.4%

67 Brandon Moseley, House Rejects Effort to Raise the Retirement Age for State Judges
to Age 75, ALA. POL. REP. (May 16, 2019), https://www.alreporter.com/2019/05/16
/house-rejects-effort-to-raise-the-retirement-age-for-state-judges-to-age-75/ [https://
perma.cc/S9S8-DYU8].
68 James C. McKinley, Jr., Plan to Raise Judges’ Retirement Age to 80 Is Rejected,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/nyregion/plan-to-raisejudges-retirement-age-to-80-is-rejected.html [https://perma.cc/2HP8-6U9E]. Controversy
surrounded the proposition because it would have severely curtailed the ability of Governor
Andrew Cuomo, a member of the Democratic party, from “shaping the state’s highest court,”
as passage of the measure would have allowed two Republican judges to serve longer terms.
Id. The governor “quietly opposed the measure in the Legislature and lobbied editorial
boards to urge people to vote no.” Id.
69 Jon Lentz, Reform Party Files Suit to Overturn New York’s Age Limit on Judges,
CITY & ST. N.Y. (July 3, 2017), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/newyork-state-articles/reform-party-sues-to-overturn-new-york-age-limit-on-judges.html
[https://perma.cc/N7SY-F5GN].
70 See generally Complaint of Petitioner, Morano v. Bd. of Elections of New York, No.
080055/17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 28, 2017), https://www.scribd.com/document/352773965
/Judicial-retirement-age-lawsuit#from_embed [https://perma.cc/N6DE-EXQP].
71 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 25.
72 Oregon Elimination of Mandatory Judicial Retirement Age, Measure 94 (2016),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Elimination_of_Mandatory_Judicial_
Retirement_Age,_Measure_94_(2016) [https://perma.cc/KRY5-ZHZS].
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opposing), despite controversy over the question’s ambiguous
wording.73
***
The federal judiciary is older than ever before. The state judiciary, while
younger, still has 25% of its judges at ages between sixty-five and seventy-five.
Moreover, there is some momentum in the states to raise age levels for judges.
But are these trends toward an older judiciary a problem? To begin answering
this question, Part III reviews the science of age-related cognitive decline.

III. AGE, COGNITIVE DECLINE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF BRAIN
BIOMARKERS OF DEMENTIA
This Part provides an overview of the known effects of aging on cognitive
function, particularly the changes in cognition that may adversely affect a
judge’s ability to effectively carry out all the duties of the office.74 Part A
examines average population trends in aging and cognition, and Part B explores
individual differences in aging trajectories. Part C provides discussion of the
brain basis for age-related changes in mental function.
Since ancient times, it has been recognized that with age comes cognitive
decline.75 Virgil, for instance, lamented that, “Time robs us all, even of
memory.”76 What is novel about contemporary understanding of age-related
mental decline is our increasing ability to pinpoint and even predict that decline
in brain circuitry.77

73 Jan Murphy, Pennsylvania Voters Approve Raising Judges’ Retirement Age,
PENNLIVE (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.pennlive.com/politics/2016/11/pennsylvania_
voters_approve_ra.html [https://perma.cc/BG5C-XD2J] (last updated Jan. 5, 2019). Two
former chief justices from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sued on the grounds that the
measure was intentionally “phrased in a deceitful way . . . by the Republican-controlled
legislature” in an effort to manipulate the vote. Angela Couloumbis, Pa. Voters Narrowly
Backing Raising Judges’ Retirement Age, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 8, 2016), https://
www.inquirer.com/philly/news/politics/20161109_Pa__voters_narrowly_back_raising
_judges__retirement _ages.html [https://perma.cc/4U4E-744B].
74 Aging judges may be problematic for reasons unrelated to cognitive health. My
primary focus here, however, is on the potential for cognitive decline.
75 Denise C. Park & Sara B. Festini, Theories of Memory and Aging: A Look at the Past
and a Glimpse of the Future, 72 J. GERONTOLOGY: PSYCHOL. SCI. 82, 82 (2017).
76 KAREN COKAYNE, EXPERIENCING OLD AGE IN ANCIENT ROME 67 (2003).
77 Denise C. Park & Patricia Reuter-Lorenz, The Adaptive Brain: Aging and
Neurocognitive Scaffolding, 60 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 173, 174 (2009) (“For the past 25 years,
our understanding of the behavioral changes that occur in cognition with age has increased
tremendously, and in the past 10 years, the advent of neuroimaging tools has ushered a truly
stunning increase in what we know about the aging mind.”).
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The brain is made up of circuits of cells.78 In the developing brain, even in
the womb, cells are forming connections and pathways that may last for much
of one’s life.79 But over time these pathways can deteriorate; as brain circuits
lose the ability to communicate, some cognitive functioning may become
affected.80 Exactly how these circuits change—and what can be done to reverse
or mitigate the effects—is the subject of much research.81
In 2018, the National Institutes of Aging and the Alzheimer’s Association
formally called for a research framework that defines Alzheimer’s disease (AD)
based on neurobiology instead of symptoms.82 Part C discusses why brain
biomarkers for AD are ushering in a paradigm shift for AD definition and
detection.

A. Group Averaged Cognitive Decline
Age-related cognitive decline is traditionally thought to begin in the later
stages of life, between the ages of fifty and sixty, with exacerbated rates of
decline noted for individuals over the age of seventy.83 Yet recent longitudinal
research suggests that cognitive decline can begin as early as age thirty, with
different rates of decline noted for different skills like memory, reasoning,
spatial visualization, and processing speed.84
Age-related trajectories vary according to cognitive domain. One distinction
made in the literature, and relevant to judicial function, is the difference between
“fluid intelligence” and “crystallized intelligence.”85 Fluid intelligence might be
thought of as processing speed and the ability to learn new tasks.86 Crystallized
intelligence is something more akin to wisdom.87
78 Esteban Real et al., Neural Circuit Inference from Function to Structure, 27 CURRENT
BIOLOGY 189, 189 (2017) (noting that “neuroscience seeks to explain brain function in terms
of the dynamics in circuits of nerve cells”).
79 Moriah E. Thomason, Structured Spontaneity: Building Circuits in the Human
Prenatal Brain, 41 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCES 1, 1 (2018).
80 John H. Morrison & Patrick R. Hof, Life and Death of Neurons in the Aging Brain,
278 SCIENCE 412, 417 (1997); Rachel D. Samson & Carol A. Barnes, Impact of Aging Brain
Circuits on Cognition, 37 EUR. J. NEUROSCIENCE 1903, 1909 (2013).
81 See, e.g., Patrick R. Hof & John H. Morrison, The Aging Brain: Morphomolecular
Senescence of Cortical Circuits, 27 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCES 607, 607 (2004).
82 Clifford R. Jack, Jr. et al., NIA-AA Research Framework: Toward a Biological
Definition of Alzheimer’s Disease, 14 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 535, 535 (2018).
83 Timothy A. Salthouse, When Does Age-Related Cognitive Decline Begin?, 30
NEUROBIOLOGY AGING 507, 508 (2009).
84 Id. at 511.
85 John L. Horn & Raymond B. Cattell, Age Differences in Fluid and Crystallized
Intelligence, 26 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 107, 107–11 (1967).
86 See John L. Horn, The Theory of Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence in Relation to
Concepts of Cognitive Psychology and Aging in Adulthood, in 8 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY
OF COMMUNICATION AND AFFECT: AGING AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES 237, 240 (F. I. M.
Craik & Sandra Trehub eds., 1982).
87 Id.

250

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:2

In an oft-cited study, psychologist Alan Kaufman sampled 1500 men and
women to determine how fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence change
over time, from adolescence to late adulthood.88 Kaufman found that fluid
intelligence increases until late adolescence, but then begins to decline in early
adulthood, with a faster rate of decline in late adulthood (around fifty-five years
of age).89 In contrast, crystallized intelligence remained stagnant until late
adulthood (around sixty years of age), and then begins to slowly decline.90 Other
studies have come to similar findings using various intelligence scales, and
some studies suggest that crystallized intelligence may actually continue to
increase across the lifespan.91
Given these different trajectories of fluid and crystallized intelligence, it is
possible that crystallized intelligence might “attenuate the effects” of agerelated declines in fluid intelligence, allowing older adults to call upon their
extensive life experiences to “offset the declining ability to process and
manipulate new information.”92 Whether fluid or crystallized intelligence
dominates the decision-making process depends on the nature of the decision
itself; some situations rely more heavily on one form of decision-making over
the other, and some situations require both types equally.93
Of importance to judging, research suggests that “executive function” and,
in particular, memory may become impaired in older age.94 Executive function
consists of “control processes responsible for planning, assembling,
coordinating, sequencing, and monitoring other cognitive operations,”
essentially existing as a mediator of brain behavior.95 With regard to memory,
“long-term memory and working memory are commonly impaired while rote
retrieval of word meaning (vocabulary) and priming remain relatively intact.”96

88 Alan S. Kaufman & John L. Horn, Age Changes on Tests of Fluid and Crystallized

Ability for Women and Men on the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT)
at Ages 17–94 Years, 11 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 97, 97 (1996). Kaufman
used the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT), which consists of four
tests for each intelligence domain. Id.
89 Id. at 106.
90 Id.
91 Lisa Zaval et al., Complementary Contributions of Fluid and Crystallized
Intelligence to Decision Making Across the Life Span, in AGING AND DECISION MAKING:
EMPIRICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 149, 150 (Thomas Hess et al. eds., 2015).
92 Id. at 154.
93 Id. at 154–55.
94 Randy L. Buckner, Memory and Executive Function in Aging and AD: Multiple
Factors that Cause Decline and Reserve Factors that Compensate, 44 NEURON 195, 196
(2004); Sarah F. MacPherson et al., Age, Executive Function, and Social Decision Making:
A Dorsolateral Prefrontal Theory of Cognitive Aging, 17 PSYCHOL. & AGING 598, 599
(2002).
95 Timothy A. Salthouse et al., Executive Functioning as a Potential Mediator of AgeRelated Cognitive Decline in Normal Adults, 132 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 566, 566
(2003).
96 Buckner, supra note 94, at 195.
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Given the judge’s role vis-à-vis litigants and staff in the courtroom, it is also
important to note that age-related brain changes affect one’s ability to interact
socially.97 Healthy social behavior heavily relies on a capacity often labeled as
“theory of mind.”98 Theory of Mind (TOM) is “the capacity to infer the likely
thoughts and intentions of others.”99 TOM capacity is involved in everyday
social skills, including “detect[ing] . . . deception, faux pas and cheating.”100
Both affective decision-making and TOM may be impaired in individuals with
dementia.101

B. Individual Differences in Aging Trajectories
While, on average, older adults experience impairment in a variety of
cognitive functions, there is considerable individual variation in the nature and
extent of those changes.102 In the context of memory ability, for instance, some
individuals start forgetting early, but “[s]ome individuals show high functioning
into their ninth and tenth decades.”103 Indeed, available data suggests that there
are roughly four trajectories of cognition change over time.104 Compared to
baseline performance at thirty-five years old, humans may experience:105



Super aging, in which there is little to no cognitive decline, and mental
faculties remain highly functioning even in later ages;
Normal aging, in which there is some decline in cognitive performance,
but not so much that it affects daily activity;

97 Julie D. Henry et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Age Differences in Theory of Mind,
28 PSYCHOL. & AGING 826, 826 (2013).
98 See Joseph M. Moran, Lifespan Development: The Effects of Typical Aging on
Theory of Mind, 237 BEHAV. BRAIN RES. 32, 33 (2013).
99 Teresa Torralva et al., The Relationship Between Affective Decision-Making and
Theory of Mind in the Frontal Variant of Fronto-Temporal Dementia, 45
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 342, 342 (2007).
100 Id. (citations omitted).
101 Id. at 347 (finding that the dementia group strategized “disadvantageously” over the
course of a gambling task, which resulted in an increase in risky decision-making relative to
the age-matched control group).
102 Naftali Raz et al., Regional Brain Changes in Aging Healthy Adults: General Trends,
Individual Differences and Modifiers, 15 CEREBRAL CORTEX 1676, 1687 (2005); Robert S.
Wilson et al., Individual Differences in Rates of Change in Cognitive Abilities of Older
Persons, 17 PSYCHOL. & AGING 179, 179 (2002).
103 Buckner, supra note 94, at 195.
104 Bruce H. Price, Chief, Dep’t of Neurology, McLean Hosp., Presentation at the “Our
Aging Brains” Conference at the Petrie-Flom Center: Cognitive Performance over the
Lifespan (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.slideshare.net/petrieflom/bruce-price-cognitiveperformance-over-the-lifespan [https://perma.cc/YS5Z-ERHH].
105 Sandra Weintraub, Cognitive Neurology & Alzheimer’s Disease Ctr., Northwestern
Univ. Feinberg Sch. of Med., Presentation: How Aging Affects the Brain and Memory: From
Alzheimer’s Disease to SuperAging (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
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Mild cognitive impairment, in which there is accelerated cognitive
decline, but not rising to the level of significantly affecting daily life;
and
Pathologic aging or dementia, in which there is accelerated cognitive
decline that does impair daily functioning.

Why some individuals follow one path or another remains poorly
understood.106 Super Agers, for instance, retain their intellectual abilities late
into their lives, without significant declines in memory, attention, language, or
executive function tests.107 Researchers have begun to identify anatomic and
genetic factors that distinguish Super Agers.108 But the mechanistic causes of
these changes, whether they result from a higher baseline intelligence or from a
genetic or environmental resistance to age-related decline, remain yet to be
determined.109
There is strong evidence that diet and exercise are protective factors for
avoiding dementia,110 but researchers and pharmaceutical companies have been
attempting to identify other protective factors or mechanisms that slow the rate
of impairment or halt its progression altogether.111 Such factors include:
recruitment of a “cognitive reserve,” which allows adults to utilize different
cognitive skills to accommodate for their diminishing capacity in other skills;
mentally stimulating activity; and physical exercise.112
The construct of “cognitive reserve” was developed to help explain why “in
the face of neurodegenerative changes that are similar in nature and extent,
106 Felicia W. Sun et al., Youthful Brains in Older Adults: Preserved Neuroanatomy in

the Default Mode and Salience Networks Contributes to Youthful Memory in Superaging, 37
J. NEUROSCIENCE 9659, 9666 (2016).
107 See Emily J. Rogalski et al., Youthful Memory Capacity in Old Brains: Anatomic and
Genetic Clues from the Northwestern SuperAging Project, 25 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
29, 33–34 (2012); Sun et al., supra note 106, at 9664–65.
108 Nicholas T. Bott et al., Youthful Processing Speed in Older Adults: Genetic,
Biological, and Behavioral Predictors of Cognitive Processing Speed Trajectories in Aging,
9 FRONTIERS AGING NEUROSCIENCE 1, 1 (2017); Nora Dunne, Unlocking the Secrets to
‘SuperAging,’ NW. MED. MAG. (2016), https://magazine.nm.org/fall-2016/features/un
locking-the-secrets-to-superaging/ [https://perma.cc/K7QV-38CS]. Led by Dr. Emily
Rogalski, the team’s primary focus has been to identify what protective factors Super Agers
possess that bar them from typical age-related decline. Id.
109 Rogalski et al., supra note 107, at 33–34.
110 Neal D. Barnard et al., Dietary and Lifestyle Guidelines for the Prevention of
Alzheimer’s Disease, 35 NEUROBIOLOGY AGING S74, S77 (2014); Nikolaos Scarmeas et al.,
Physical Activity, Diet, and Risk of Alzheimer Disease, 302 JAMA 627, 627 (2009).
111 Claire Mount & Christian Downton, Alzheimer Disease: Progress or Profit?, 12
NATURE MED. 780, 784 (2006) (noting that “[a]lthough current treatments for Alzheimer
disease have witnessed phenomenal sales growth and will continue to do so, they have
provided only modest symptomatic relief, and much of their success appears to be borne of
the significant unmet need”).
112 Dennis J. Selkoe, Preventing Alzheimer’s Disease, 337 SCIENCE 1488, 1491 (2012);
see Lawrence J. Whalley et al., Cognitive Reserve and the Neurobiology of Cognitive Aging,
3 AGEING RES. REVIEWS 369, 375 (2004).
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individuals vary considerably in the severity of cognitive aging.”113 The
cognitively capable adult brain can withstand age-related decline much better
than individuals with less cognitive capabilities.114
Because judges are highly educated, it is relevant to note research finding
that environmental factors such as higher childhood intelligence and higher
educational attainment are protective against later-life cognitive decline.115
Mentally stimulating activity may also protect against cognitive decline.116

C. The Neurobiology of Aging
Research has emerged on age-related changes in both the normal and
diseased state. In this Section, I first review brain changes in normal aging, and
then turn to the pathology of Alzheimer’s disease (AD).

1. The Aging Brain
Advances in neuroimaging techniques have made it easier to identify agerelated structural and functional changes in the brain.117 Changes over time
include:


A reduction in regional brain volume, with certain areas of the brain
appearing to be more susceptible to volume loss, including the frontal
and parietal lobes.118

113 Whalley et al., supra note 112, at 369.
114 See id. at 374.
115 See id. at 370, 375; see also Michael J. Valenzuela & Perminder Sachdev, Brain

Reserve and Dementia: A Systematic Review, 36 PSYCHOL. MED. 441, 442 (2005). A
physically active lifestyle is also a protective factor, but it is unclear whether judges are
disproportionally more physically active than the general public. The Louisiana Judges and
Lawyers Assistance Program, for instance, notes that “[o]ften times we [lawyers and judges]
give up nutrition, sleep, and physical activity and place our energies on life’s demands.”
Wellness, LA. JUDGES & LAWYERS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, INC., http://louisianajlap.com/
issues-concerns/wellness/ [https://perma.cc/T3Z6-VAAZ].
116 Robert S. Wilson et al., Cognitive Activity and the Cognitive Morbidity of Alzheimer
Disease, 75 NEUROLOGY 990, 994 (2010) (reporting on a study in which researchers
longitudinally analyzed activity patterns and cognitive decline for about six years, finding
that mentally stimulating activity in older age significantly slowed the rate of cognitive
decline in patients with Alzheimer’s disease).
117 Timothy A. Salthouse, Neuroanatomical Substrates of Age-Related Cognitive
Decline, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 753, 759 (2011).
118 Id. at 761. Reduction in brain volume is likely due to a reduction in the number of
connections a neuron has with other neurons through their dendrites (also referred to as
dendritic arborization) and loss of synapses between neurons, not through the loss of
neurons. Id. This measure serves as a “crude” indicator of cognitive performance, and the
causal relationship between reduced brain volume and cognitive functioning are not well
supported. Id.
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Disruptions in brain network connectivity, described as a reduction in
white matter integrity, with the largest effects being observed in the
frontal regions of the brain, which are important for planning and
decision-making.119

Some evidence suggests that older adults recruit different brain networks to
solve the same problems as younger adults.120 The aging brain may be organized
differently than the younger brain, but it may still be able to accomplish many
of the same tasks.121
Within the prefrontal cortex, age-related changes to the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex may be of particular importance.122 This region is primarily
thought to be involved in executive function and complex reasoning.123 By
comparison, few age-related changes occur in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, which is thought to be involved in emotion detection.124 Age-related
impairment in the function of the prefrontal cortex may be mediated through
dysfunction of the dopaminergic system in the brain.125 Dopamine is the
primary neurotransmitter in the prefrontal cortex and striatal systems, and
disruptions to the dopaminergic system mediate age-related declines in
cognition, including executive function, episodic memory, and processing
speed.126
119 M. O’Sullivan et al., Evidence for Cortical “Disconnection” as a Mechanism of Age-

Related Cognitive Decline, 57 NEUROLOGY 632, 632, 635 (2001); see also Carl Engelking,
Brain Area for Decision-Making and Planning Is “Uniquely Human,” DISCOVER (Jan. 30,
2014), https://www.discovermagazine.com/mind/brain-area-for-decision-making-andplanning-is-uniquely-human [https://perma.cc/UT55-R69J]. Another review conducted
by Dr. John Morrison in 2012 further supported the correlation between cognitive
impairment and “synaptic alterations” between neurons in certain areas of the brain instead
of the outright loss of neurons. John H. Morrison & Mark G. Baxter, The Ageing Cortical
Synapse: Hallmarks and Implications for Cognitive Decline, 13 NATURE REVIEWS
NEUROSCIENCE 240, 240 (2012). Regional connections between brain structures appear to
mediate specific cognitive skills, with fractional anisotropy (measure of tract integrity) in the
anterior, posterior, and mediotemporal regions associated with speed and working memory,
executive function, and memory respectively. See O’Sullivan et al., supra note 119, at 635.
This conclusion supports the cortical disconnection hypothesis, which is a hypothesis that
suggests that as humans age, the white matter tracts that connect various regions of the brain
degrade, resulting in a “loss of functional integration of neurocognitive networks.” Id. at 632.
120 Kirk R. Daffner & Kim C. Willment, Executive Control, the Regulation of GoalDirected Behaviors, and the Impact of Dementing Illness, in DEMENTIA: COMPREHENSIVE
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note 13, at 71, 89–90.
121 See Roser Sala-Llonch et al., Reorganization of Brain Networks in Aging: A Review
of Functional Connectivity Studies, 6 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1, 5 (2015).
122 See MacPherson et al., supra note 94, at 598.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 607.
125 Lars Bäckman et al., Linking Cognitive Aging to Alterations in Dopamine
Neurotransmitter Functioning: Recent Data and Future Avenues, 34 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 670, 675 (2010).
126 Id. at 670, 675.
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2. Neurobiology of Alzheimer’s Disease
In 2010, an estimated 4.7 million Americans aged sixty-five and older
suffered from Alzheimer’s disease (AD); by 2050, this number is projected to
reach 13.8 million.127 Although there is currently no cure for AD,128 new
neuroimaging techniques are being developed to detect biomarkers for
Alzheimer’s in its earliest stages.129 Such biomarkers can identify atrophying
neural tissue in people with AD before they manifest observable behavioral
changes.130 In 2004, the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI)
was formed to develop a range of biomarkers—including imaging, genetic, and
biochemical markers—for the early detection and monitoring of AD.131 For
clinicians, this early detection can help facilitate prevention or help slow the
disease’s progression.132
New diagnostic options for clinical use are emerging. 133 In 2012, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approved an imaging technique that uses
positron emission tomography (PET) scanning with the radioactive tracing
compound Florbetapir F-18 to identify the accumulation of amyloid-β (Aβ)
plaques, which are believed to play a central role in AD.134
In addition, the National Institute of Aging and the Alzheimer’s Association
have worked over the past decade to better define and identify the preclinical
(i.e., without symptoms) stages of AD.135 In 2011, the working group “created
separate diagnostic recommendations for the preclinical, mild cognitive
impairment, and dementia stages of Alzheimer’s disease.”136 In 2018, on the
127 Liesi E. Hebert et al., Alzheimer Disease in the United States (2010–2050) Estimated

Using the 2010 Census, 80 NEUROLOGY 1778, 1778 (2013).
128 See John R. Hodges, A Decade of Discovery and Disappointment in Dementia
Research, 11 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROLOGY 613, 614 (2015).
129 Simon F. Eskildsen et al., Structural Imaging Biomarkers of Alzheimer’s Disease:
Predicting Disease Progression, 36 NEUROBIOLOGY AGING S23, S23 (2015); Massimo S.
Fiandaca et al., The Critical Need for Defining Preclinical Biomarkers in Alzheimer’s
Disease, 10 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA S196, S200–01 (2014); Shannon L. Risacher &
Andrew J. Saykin, Neuroimaging and Other Biomarkers for Alzheimer’s Disease: The
Changing Landscape of Early Detection, 9 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 621, 625 (2013).
130 See Fiandaca et al., supra note 129, at S199; Risacher & Saykin, supra note 129, at
637.
131 Michael W. Weiner et al., 2014 Update of the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging
Initiative: A Review of Papers Published Since Its Inception, 11 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA
e1, e1–e2 (2015).
132 See Fiandaca et al., supra note 129, at S197.
133 See, e.g., Lucie Yang et al., Brain Amyloid Imaging—FDA Approval of Florbetapir
F18 Injection, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 885, 885 (2012).
134 Id.
135 See Reisa A. Sperling et al., Toward Defining the Preclinical Stages of Alzheimer’s
Disease: Recommendations from the National Institute on Aging−Alzheimer’s Association
Workgroups on Diagnostic Guidelines for Alzheimer’s Disease, 7 ALZHEIMER’S &
DEMENTIA 280, 280 (2011).
136 Jack et al., supra note 82, at 535.
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basis of ongoing neuroscience research, the same working group published a
landmark paper in which it proposed a diagnosis of AD that was “not based on
the clinical consequences of the disease (i.e., symptoms/signs),” but which
“shifts the definition of AD in living people from a syndromal to a biological
construct.”137 The proposed “research framework focuses on the diagnosis of
AD with biomarkers in living persons.”138 Specifically, AD would require a
finding of both Aβ plaques and pathologic tau deposits.139
More broadly, the framework introduced an “Alzheimer’s continuum,”
which would include both those with Alzheimer’s disease (i.e., those with the
established biomarkers) and those in the category of “Alzheimer’s pathologic
change,” an “early stage of Alzheimer’s continuum, defined in vivo by an
abnormal Aβ biomarker with normal pathologic tau biomarker.”140 Notably,
and important for the analysis to follow in the judicial context, under this
framework an individual (such as a judicial nominee) could be both symptomfree and diagnosed as being on the Alzheimer’s continuum.141
Under the new framework, for many individuals there will be a lengthy
period (fifteen to twenty years) of brain change without symptoms.142 As lead
author Clifford Jack observed: “In every other area where biomarkers exist—
hypertension, diabetes, cancer—the disease identified in an asymptomatic
individual is still the disease. If cancer is detected on a screening colonoscopy,
it’s still cancer, even if the person doesn’t have symptoms.”143
The transition from symptom-based to biologically based detection of AD
offers clinicians an opportunity to intervene earlier in the progression of the
disease.144 The proposed framework would fundamentally change the definition
of AD; not surprisingly, it has been heavily debated.145 Chief amongst the

137 Id. (emphasis added).
138 Id.
139 See id. at 536.
140 Id. at 539, 541 (emphasis added).
141 Id. at 548.
142 Nina Silverberg et al., NIA Commentary on the NIA-AA Research Framework:

Towards a Biological Definition of Alzheimer’s Disease, 14 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 576,
576 (2018). “Postulated Disease Continuum. The current recognized biomarkers are positive
20−30 years prior to symptoms. Risk factors that can impact symptoms are present
throughout the lifecourse. Prospective biomarkers will emerge more closely in time with
symptoms.” Id. at 577.
143 New Definition of Alzheimer’s Hinges on Biology, Not Symptoms, ALZFORUM (Apr.
13, 2018), https://www.alzforum.org/news/research-news/new-definition-alzheimershinges-biology-not-symptoms [https://perma.cc/3VUU-DRYD].
144 See Sperling et al., supra note 135, at 181.
145 See generally, e.g., Mario D. Garrett & Ramón Valle, A Methodological Critique of
the National Institute of Aging and Alzheimer’s Association Guidelines for Alzheimer’s
Disease, Dementia, and Mild Cognitive Impairments, 15 DEMENTIA 239 (2016) (questioning
the validity of certain biomarkers and their ultimate progression to AD).
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critiques is that it is too early to use biomarkers because the “extent and quality
of diagnostic biomarker data currently available is still in its infancy.”146
For purposes of evaluating judicial cognitive function, the availability of
new biomarkers—even if they were to be used for assessing risk, not
diagnosis—raises both promise and peril. I discuss this further in Part V.

IV. JUDICIAL COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT: THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Part II established that America’s judiciary is aging.147 Part III established
that, on average, age is associated with cognitive decline in domains of cognitive
function that are relevant to judging.148 But it does not necessarily follow that a
sufficiently large number of sitting judges are, or will become, cognitively
impaired to the point that they cannot execute their duties. This is because judges
may be a subgroup with particularly strong cognitive reserve; because judges
may effectively self-police and leave the bench before significant decline;
and/or because the existing system adequately intervenes when needed.
Part IV explores these possibilities, in particular whether self-policing and
existing policies for addressing judicial cognitive decline are adequate as
presently designed. Section A argues that there is reason for concern about agerelated cognitive decline in judges. Section B then considers at length whether
the current federal system is adequate to address instances of judicial cognitive
decline.

A. Concerns About Judicial Age-Related Cognitive Decline
Although the thrust of my argument is that we should be empowering aging
judges, it is important to clarify that I am not arguing there is no cause for
concern. Although there is no direct evidence available to estimate the
prevalence of cognitive decline in state and federal judges, there is some
empirical data suggesting this is the case,149 and a strong circumstantial case
can be made that commentators’ concerns are not unreasonable. At the outset,
though, because childhood intelligence and education levels are protective
factors against dementia,150 it seems plausible that judges as a group might have
lower incidence rates of mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer’s disease.151
146 Id. at 241.
147 See supra Part II.
148 See supra Part III.
149 See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim

Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 258 (2008).
(suggesting in Figure 7 that “there may be a relationship between age of the district court
judge and the quality of a district court judge’s patent decision-making (as measured by
Federal Circuit claim construction reversal)”).
150 Valenzuela & Sachdev, supra note 115, at 442.
151 See, e.g., Xiangfei Meng & Carl D’Arcy, Education and Dementia in the Context of
the Cognitive Reserve Hypothesis: A Systematic Review with Meta-Analyses and Qualitative
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But even if we assume that judges have a lower rate of AD than the general
public, it leaves open the question of whether that rate is still high enough to
warrant concern, and whether the deficits that attach to normal cognitive
aging—which might not affect daily living activities—are of concern when
carrying out the judicial function.
Put another way: does the judicial nomination and selection process select
only for Super Agers? If all judges were Super Agers, there would be little cause
for concern with aging judges from the perspective of mental decline on the
bench.
Without direct evidence, it is impossible to rule out the possibility. If 10%
of the population are Super Agers, then it is mathematically possible that all of
the 30,000 state judges and 1700 Article III judges are Super Agers.152
However, this seems highly unlikely.
First, despite the fantasy on airport bookshelves that we can “All Become
‘Super Agers,’”153 Super Agers comprise only 10−20% of the population.154
This does not mean that the other 80–90% of the population will develop a form
of dementia, or even mild cognitive impairment, but it does mean that skills such
as memory recall almost always decline with age.155 Second, although possible,
it seems implausible that the legal system would be selecting for Super Agers
as judges when scientists do not yet know the factors that distinguish those who
will age normally versus those who will be high functioning outliers.156
In addition, multiple interviews with physicians who diagnose dementia
suggest that they are regularly (albeit not frequently) contacted by concerned
colleagues and friends of judges.157 Notably, it is often not the judges
themselves who reach out, but someone who is concerned about the judge.158
While my limited number of interviews does not constitute a representative
sample, it is worth noting that these care providers agree with the general
Analyses, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2012). However, the relationship between education and agerelated cognitive decline is still being debated. See Whalley et al., supra note 112, at 375.
152 See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FAQS: JUDGES IN THE
UNITED STATES 3, https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/judge
_faq.pdf [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (“There are approximately 30,000 state
judges, compared to only 1,700 federal judges.”).
153 Lori Russell-Chapin, How Can We All Become “Super Agers?,” PSYCHOL. TODAY
(Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/brain-waves/201710/howcan-we-all-become-super-agers [https://perma.cc/5MJK-9ZGG] (suggesting that readers
can “[p]ractice these simple strategies to keep the brain young”).
154 Price, supra note 104.
155 Rogalski et al., supra note 107, at 30.
156 Id. at 35.
157 Interviews with care providers in psychology, psychiatry, and neurology (Aug.–Nov.
2018) [on file with author].
158 Id. This is consistent with a more general pattern, in which the affected individual is
not the one who first sees the symptoms of possible dementia. See David Knopman et al.,
Patterns of Care in the Early Stages of Alzheimer’s Disease: Impediments to Timely
Diagnosis, 48 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 300, 302 (2000).
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proposition that there is reason to be concerned about undiagnosed cognitive
decline on the bench.159 This is in part, as discussed above, because decline is
often subtle and hard to detect.160
For these reasons, as well as the extensive record (reviewed below) of
documented instances of judicial cognitive decline,161 I will proceed on what I
take to be a reasonable assumption that all judges are not Super Agers, that some
judges will experience normal cognitive aging, and that some judges will
experience either mild cognitive impairment or some form of more progressive
dementia.

B. Responding to Judicial Cognitive Decline
Concerns over mentally incompetent judges have been recognized since the
time of the country’s founding,162 and a variety of solutions have been
implemented to address these concerns.163 As legal scholar Charles Geyh has
observed, “As the sheer number of attempts at legislation imply, judicial
disability has posed a chronic problem for Congress.”164
Public allegations of the mental incompetence of judges are rare,165 but this
“reveal[s] little about the true extent of the problem”166 because there has
traditionally been a taboo on openly discussing the issue of declining capacity

159 Interviews with care providers in psychology, psychiatry, and neurology (Aug.–Nov.

2018) [on file with author].
160 GLENN E. SMITH & MARK W. BONDI, MILD COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT AND DEMENTIA:
DEFINITIONS, DIAGNOSIS, AND TREATMENT 15–16 (2013).
161 See infra Part IV.B.
162 See John S. Goff, Old Age and the Supreme Court, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 30–31 (Glenn R. Winters ed., 1973). One historical moment of
note is a letter by Justice William Johnson (the “First Dissenter”) to Thomas Jefferson on
Dec. 10, 1822. Mark R. Killenbeck, No Bed of Roses: William Johnson, Thomas Jefferson
and the Supreme Court, 1822−23, 37 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 95, 95 (2012). The twenty-page letter
contained many points, but most relevant for my purposes was his observation that several
of his colleagues on the bench were mentally unfit for service: “Cushing was
incompetent . . . Patterson was a slow man & willingly declined the trouble . . . .” Id. at 104.
163 See, e.g., Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal
Judicial Service—and Disservice—1789−1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 395 (1993)
(“Congress has occasionally acted over the years to deal with these problems by giving aging
judges incentives to retire.”).
164 Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
243, 275 (1993).
165 See Jackson Hobbs, “So Delicate a Subject”: Maintaining an Independent and SelfRegulated Judiciary in the Face of Judicial Aging and Disability, 85 UMKC L. REV. 805,
813 (2017) (“The statistics illustrate that of the 5,277 allegations investigated, merely 190,
or 3.6%, of the allegations involved mental or physical disability.”).
166 Geyh, supra note 164, at 275.
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of fellow judges.167 Indeed, in 1971, the Supreme Court chided a circuit court
for broaching “so delicate a subject” when the circuit court raised concerns
about the mental competence of a state court judge in a published opinion.168
However, judges have since noted that “[w]e have come a long way from the
day when discussion of a judge’s mental state was considered a breach of
decorum.”169
Here, I review several (non-mutually exclusive) avenues by which the
challenge of cognitively impaired judges can be addressed within the current
system: (1) create incentives for the judge to voluntarily choose retirement, (2)
involuntarily remove the judge on the basis of disability pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 372; (3) file a formal complaint under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act;
(4) pursue post-hoc relief via a due process claim; and (5) apply informal
pressures to encourage the judge to retire. The available evidence suggests that
the last option, informal mechanisms, remains the primary method by which
most issues are resolved.

1. Creating Incentives for Judicial Retirement
A straightforward way to address the issue of aging judges is to create
stronger incentives for retirement. This was the first response from Congress, in
1869, when it passed a law to allow judges to retire at age seventy and receive
the same salary as when active.170 The Act spurred a number of retirements.171
The introduction of senior status in 1919,172 however, changed the nature
of retirement. Judges were now able to continue to serve on a reduced
caseload.173 Emily Field Van Tassel’s extensive study on judicial retirement
167 See United States v. Washington, 98 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (referencing an earlier time “when discussion of a judge’s mental state was
considered a breach of decorum”).
168 Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53, 53–54 (1971) (per curiam).
169 Washington, 98 F.3d at 1166 (1996) (Kozinski, J., concurring). Indeed, several
judges have discussed these concerns at length, but this discussion appears to remain the
stuff of concurrences and dissents. See, e.g., Deere v. Cullen, 718 F.3d 1124, 1162–63 (9th
Cir. 2013) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“[T]his is not a perfect world. Some judges stay on too
long. They decide cases when they are no longer competent to do so.”); Washington, 98 F.3d
at 1166 (“With the size of the federal judiciary steadily on the rise, and with advances in
medical technology making it possible to survive disabilities that would have been fatal in
earlier days, the delicate question of whether a judge has (or in the past had) the mental
capacity to sit will become increasingly troublesome.”).
170 Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 5, Pub. L. No. 41-22, 16 Stat. 44, 45 (“[A]ny judge of
any court of the United States, who . . . having attained to the age of seventy years, [shall]
resign his office, shall thereafter, during the residue of his natural life, receive the same salary
which was by law payable to him at the time of his resignation.”).
171 Van Tassel, supra note 163, at 395–97 (noting that before this Act, and “[l]acking
any provision for retirement, many judges remained on the bench after becoming incapable
of serving adequately”).
172 See id. at 397.
173 Id. at 397–98.
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finds that senior status, as opposed to full resignation of duties, is by far the
more attractive option.174 Van Tassel finds that “[f]rom 1980 to 1989, at least
197 judges retired from regular active service (took ‘senior status’),” while only
“fourteen ‘retired from the office.’”175 In the period 1990 to 1992, 86% of
judges elected senior status over outright retirement.176
If moving to senior status required a cognitive assessment, we could have
more confidence that there was a correlation between taking senior status and
likelihood of remaining mentally sharp. But as present, to move to senior status,
a “judge simply writes a letter to the President stating that on a particular date
the judge intends to retire from regular active service, having met the requisite
age and service requirements, and that the judge intends to continue to render
substantial judicial service as a senior judge.”177
Historically, there has been concern that retirement alone would not be
enough to account for disabled judges.178 In 1809, Congress passed a law
“requiring the Supreme Court justice assigned to the circuit in which there was
a disabled district judge to issue certiorari to the clerk of the district court to
certify all pending matters to the next circuit court.”179 In 1850, further
Congressional action required that a district judge from another district be
brought in to carry out the work of the disabled judge.180

2. Involuntary Removal for Disability
In 1919, Congress first gave to the President the power to appoint a new,
temporary judge in a district where a disabled judge sits.181 The current statute
reads:
(b) Whenever any judge of the United States appointed to hold office
during good behavior who is eligible to retire under this section does not do so
and a certificate of his disability signed by a majority of the members of the
Judicial Council of his circuit in the case of a circuit or district judge, or by the
Chief Justice of the United States in the case of the Chief Judge of the Court of
International Trade, or by the chief judge of his court in the case of a judge of
174 See id. at 399.
175 Id. at 399.
176 Id. Though Van Tassel notes that the retirements may be a conduit to return to

lucrative private practice, Van Tassel cautions that more research is required: “[F]urther
study should be done of both senior judges and judges who have retired from the office in
the twentieth century.” Id. at 400; see also Mary L. Clark, Judicial Retirement and Return to
Practice, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 841, 896 (2011).
177 Block, supra note 27, at 536.
178 Van Tassel, supra note 163, at 400 (“Retirement provisions did not solve all the
problems of incapacity on the bench.”).
179 Id. at 400–01.
180 Id. at 401.
181 Act of Feb. 25, 1919, ch. 29, § 6, Pub. L. No. 65-265, 40 Stat. 1156, 1158; see also
Van Tassel, supra note 163, at 397 n.301.
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the Court of International Trade, is presented to the President and the President
finds that such judge is unable to discharge efficiently all the duties of his office
by reason of permanent mental or physical disability and that the appointment
of an additional judge is necessary for the efficient dispatch of business, the
President may make such appointment by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate.182

Under this provision, the President’s appointment is temporary,183 and the
disabled judge will be treated as a junior colleague to the temporarily appointed
judge.184
Although the potential for involuntary removal exists, it has rarely been
used.185 The available historical record suggests that this involuntary disability
provision has been invoked six times.186 It is rarely invoked because, as
discussed below, informal application of pressure to retire is the primary
mechanism by which the system responds to problem judges.187

3. Due Process Claims on Grounds of Judges’ Mental Competence
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution guarantee
that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.”188 Courts typically “presume . . . that constitutional due process
requires an impartial and mentally competent judicial officer.”189 However, the
Supreme Court has never explicitly so held.190 It has held that, with respect to
jurors, “a defendant has a right to ‘a tribunal both impartial and mentally

182 28 U.S.C. § 372 (2002).
183 Id. (“Whenever any such additional judge is appointed, the vacancy subsequently

caused by the death, resignation, or retirement of the disabled judge shall not be filled.”).
184 Id. (“Any judge whose disability causes the appointment of an additional judge shall,
for purpose of precedence, service as chief judge, or temporary performance of the duties of
that office, be treated as junior in commission to the other judges of the circuit, district, or
court.”).
185 See Geyh, supra note 164, at 275.
186 Id.
187 See infra Part IV.B.4.
188 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
189 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Bisno v. N. Beverly Park Homeowners Ass’n,
552 U.S. 950 (2007) (No. 07-1631), 2007 WL 2261607; see also Smith v. Cox, 435 F.2d
453, 460 (4th Cir. 1970) (“We have no doubt that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment guarantees that the determination of sentence be made by a judicial officer
mentally competent to carry out his duties.”).
190 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 189, at 14.
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competent to afford a hearing.’”191 The Court has had the opportunity to extend
this holding explicitly to judges but declined to do so.192
Regardless of the constitutional status of claims about the mental capacity
of a presiding judge, courts may be skeptical of such claims’ factual merits.193
In Slayton v. Smith, a per curiam Supreme Court chastised as procedurally
irregular the Fourth Circuit’s paean to the due process requirement of a mentally
competent judiciary where the state judge in question had resigned within nine
months of the defendant’s conviction allegedly after a complaint to the governor
regarding his competence.194 Moreover, courts have been skeptical of
allegations of mental incompetence in judges in other contexts of review.195
In United States v. Washington,196 three Indian Tribes sought relief under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)197 after a newspaper article reported
that the relevant judge had Alzheimer’s disease when he ruled against them.198
The article was published several years after the judge’s death and many years
after the proceeding.199 In rejecting the Tribes’ motion for relief, the Ninth
Circuit expressed skepticism about the evidence.200 The court pointed to the
high abuse of discretion standard under which it was reviewing the case, as well
as the fact that the judge’s son said his father had been competent at the time of
the ruling,201 and that the judge was open about his medical problems during the

191 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 126 (1987) (quoting Jordan v. Massachusetts,
225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912)). Note that in both Tanner and Jordan the Supreme Court rejected
the challenge to the jurors’ competence. Id.; Jordan, 225 U.S. at 177.
192 See, e.g., N. Beverly Park Homeowners Ass’n v. Bisno, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644 (2007),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 950 (2007). It is, of course, entirely possible that, given the highly
contested factual records in these kinds of cases, the Court is either (1) skeptical of the factual
merits in the cases that it has been presented with thus far, or (2) waiting for an adequately
clear factual record to avoid ruling on facts, or both.
193 See, e.g., Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53, 54 (1971) (per curiam).
194 See id.; see also Cox, 435 F.2d at 459.
195 See, e.g., Deere v. Cullen, 718 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2013) (federal habeas relief);
United States v. Washington, 98 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1996) (review under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)).
196 See generally Washington, 98 F.3d 1159.
197 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) (“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or
its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any other reason
that justifies relief.”).
198 See Washington, 98 F.3d at 1162.
199 See id.
200 See id. at 1163 (“This is not one of those rare cases where ‘extraordinary
circumstances’ warrant vacating an ‘erroneous judgment.’ The Three Tribes offer only Judge
Boldt’s death certificate and the Seattle Post-Intelligencer Article to support their contention
that Judge Boldt may have suffered some mental impairment in 1979.” (emphasis added)).
201 See id. at 1162–63 (“Judge Boldt’s son also stated in the article that he believed his
father to have been mentally competent when he ruled against the tribes in 1979: ‘He loved
the law.’ ‘He would not do anything to violate his duties as a judge.’”).
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proceedings and the appellate court had affirmed his ruling on the merits.202
Judge Kozinski filed an energetic concurrence in which he argued that the tribes’
evidence would have been sufficient, but that Rule 60(b)(6) does not permit
relief on grounds of the judge’s mental incompetence.203
Also illustrative is Deere v. Cullen.204 Judge Fred Metheny was appointed
to California’s Riverside County Superior Court in 1971.205 In 1986, at age 64,
he sentenced convicted murderer Ronald Deere to death.206 In 1993, Deere filed
a federal habeas corpus petition to challenge his death sentence.207 While Deere
sought federal habeas relief for traditional claims, such as whether he was
competent to plead guilty,208 he also argued that Judge Metheny was mentally
incompetent due to dementia at the time of the sentencing.209
To support his claim, Deere offered four affidavits from attorneys.210 These
attorneys observed, amongst other things, that there were rumors that Judge
Metheny was suffering from Alzheimer’s at the time;211 that Judge Metheny’s
“faculties seemed to have deteriorated over the years;”212 and that he made
“strange rulings and off-hand remarks.”213 When Deere’s attorney attempted to
contact Judge Metheny in 1993, Judge Metheny’s wife told her that he was ill,
could not remember his cases, and had an “Alzheimer’s-type condition.”214
In light of this, Deere requested additional discovery and an evidentiary
hearing on Judge Metheny’s mental competence at the time of sentencing.215 A
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel, however, upheld the district court’s
decision to deny Deere’s request.216 In the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the central
consideration was that Deere’s evidence consisted primarily of anecdotes that,
in the Court’s view, “reveal[ed] no more than eccentricity as distinguished from
dementia.”217 Moreover, the opinion emphasized that Deere “furnished

202 See id. at 1161–62 (“This court affirmed Judge Boldt because ‘the district court
correctly resolved this question despite its failure to apply the proper standard.’”).
203 See id. at 1164 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
204 Deere v. Cullen, 718 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2013).
205 Fred Ray Metheny; Riverside County Judge, War Hero, L.A. TIMES (June 27, 1996),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-06-27-mn-19045-story.html [https://
perma.cc/K6RK-7SYD].
206 Deere, 718 F.3d at 1152.
207 Id. at 1139.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 1140, 1148.
210 Id. at 1148.
211 Id. at 1149.
212 Deere, 718 F.3d at 1149.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1140.
216 Id. at 1152.
217 Id. at 1127 (alteration added).
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nothing—zero—from any mental health professional opining that any of the
stories about Judge Metheny might be indicative of mental impairment.”218
In a lengthy dissent, Judge William Fletcher challenged the majority: “The
majority holds that a judge suffering from dementia may sentence a man to
death. I disagree.”219 Fletcher provided a detailed review of the record, which
suggested many instances of concerning behavior from Judge Metheny around
the time of sentencing. For instance, in a local newspaper story in 1987, one
anonymous attorney noted that Judge Metheny “appear[ed] to have little grasp
of what’s going on.”220
Looking backward, we will never know whether Judge Metheny was or was
not mentally competent when he sentenced Ronald Deere to death. But looking
forward, I argue in this Article that by expanding the use of cognitive health
assessment tools in the judicial system, the system and the judges themselves
will have more than speculation and anecdotes on which to base their decisions
about judicial competence.

4. The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980
A formal option to address judicial mental incapacity is the Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (“the 1980
Act”).221 Before the 1980 Act, Congressional debate centered around two
primary modes of promoting judicial accountability: “[T]he primary alternatives
considered by Congress were (1) establishing a central body of judges with
broad powers to discipline and even remove federal judges and (2) formalizing
or augmenting the system of decentralized self-regulation already in place by
virtue of the general powers of the judicial councils of the respective
circuits.”222 During these debates, the Judicial Conference advocated for the
decentralized system and argued that its informal mechanisms were already
effective.223 Ultimately, the 1980 Act retained the decentralized self-regulation
structure, but provided new procedural avenues for complaints.224
218 Deere, 718 F.3d at 1127.
219 Id. at 1152.
220 Id. at 1156.
221 Judicial Council Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L.

No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035.
222 Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation,
Accountability, and Judicial Independence under the Federal Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 29 (1993) (citations omitted).
223 In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 570 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009), as
corrected (June 26, 2009).
224 See id. at 1153. The Council “pointed out to Congress that the circuit council, acting
solely under the administrative authority conferred upon them by section 332, and without
outside intervention, had established administrative procedures for handling complaints of
judicial misconduct, and had for many years dealt quietly, informally, and effectively with
‘problem judges’—disabled judges, alcoholic judges, senile judges, procrastinators.” Id. at
1148.
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The 1980 Act established an administrative procedure to handle complaints
against federal judges for mental disability.225 Under the procedure, any person
can file a complaint “alleging that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to
the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or
alleging that such judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason
of mental or physical disability.”226
When the chief judge receives a complaint, he or she determines whether
the facts warrant forming an investigatory committee and may conduct a limited
inquiry to do so.227 If the chief judge believes there are sufficient grounds, he or
she forms a special committee including themselves and equal numbers of
circuit and district judges of the circuit.228 This special committee conducts an
investigation and files a comprehensive written report with the circuit council,
with recommendations for action.229 The council can either dismiss the
complaint or take a range of actions including: (1) temporary halting case
assignments; (2) private or public censure; (3) certifying the judge’s disability
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(b); (4) requesting such judge’s voluntary
retirement; or (5) ordering the removal from office of term-limited judges.230
The council may also petition the Judicial Conference to take action, including
advising the House of Representatives that impeachment may be warranted.231
The complaint to the judicial council is not a request for judicial recusal, but
rather “a separate action from the court case itself.”232 This means that the
original proceeding can continue, and indeed could be resolved before the
judicial council reaches the complaint.233 One open question in applying the
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act is whether normal, age-related cognitive
decline would constitute either a physical or mental “disability.”234 However
defined, since the Act’s enactment, there have been few instances of formal
complaints based on judicial disability.235
The most extensive study of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980
was carried out by a study committee led by Associate Justice Stephen

225 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2012); see also Hobbs, supra note 165, at 811–13
(discussing the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980).
226 28 U.S.C. § 351(a).
227 Id. §§ 352, 353(a).
228 Id. § 353(a).
229 Id. § 353(c).
230 Id. § 354(a)(2)–(3).
231 28 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
232 Hobbs, supra note 165, at 810.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 816–17 (“Neither the Breyer Report nor the Amended Guide to Judiciary Policy
make a distinction between mental disability and age related cognitive decline.”).
235 Geyh, supra note 164, at 276 (finding that the data “does not translate into an
excessive number of disabled judges active in the judiciary”).
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Breyer.236 Published in 2006, the major conclusion of the report was that the
Act was being properly implemented.237 Notably for the analysis in this Article,
“[a]lmost all complaints allege misconduct rather than disability.”238
Consistent with the intent of the Act’s sponsors, “informal efforts to resolve
problems remain . . . the principal means by which the judicial branch deals with
problems of judicial misconduct and disability.”239 Informal efforts are
primarily directed at resolving issues of decisional delay, mental and physical
disability, and complaints about the judge’s temperament.240 I turn now to an
examination of those informal mechanisms.

5. Informal Mechanisms
Although the formal mechanisms discussed above are available, in practice
it is informal approaches by which most judicial disability issues are
addressed.241 This use of informal mechanisms is grounded in historical
practice.242 As described in one study, these informal methods can require
significant effort:
Chief Judge Charles Clark [on the Fifth Circuit] used an assortment of
techniques to induce three chief district judges then in their mid-80s to step
down from their administrative posts. He applied pressure on one judge’s
secretary, while in another case he made “use of a sort of high-grade
blackmail,” by threatening “that the Bar Association was going to take the
matter to the newspapers.” The entire proceeding is tortuous. One chief judge
recalled it as being “rather unpleasant, both for the person who goes to see the
aged judge and . . . for the aged judge himself.” So the Sixth Circuit Council
had discovered in the Underwood affair. But, the chief judge declared: “We
kept after him, and the largest newspaper in Ohio with statewide circulation
published some accounts concerning the way he was handling his work, and
236 THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT & DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE (Sept.
2006), reprinted in 239 F.R.D. 116 (2006) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONDUCT DISABILITY].
237 Id. at 5 (“[T]he chief circuit judges and judicial councils have properly implemented
the Act in respect to the vast majority of the complaints filed . . . .”).
238 Id. at 6. Only 3.6% of the complaints were for physical or mental disability. Id. at 25.
239 Id. at 7.
240 Id. at 101. “Barr and Willging’s 1991–1992 study for the National Commission
pointed to three examples of problems dealt with by informal actions. Disability allegations
were the most frequent—‘a host of physical and mental symptoms ranging from a memory
afflicted by Alzheimer’s disease to an inability to speak as a result of a stroke.’” Id. (quoting
Barr & Willging, supra note 222, at 139–40).
241 Geyh, supra note 164, at 276 (finding that “informal actions by the chief circuit and
district judges appear to be used with the most frequency and to the greatest effect” when
handling cases of disabled judges).
242 Id. at 279 (“[D]erivation of informal action by chief circuit judges in response to
episodes of judicial misbehavior may be more firmly rooted in tradition than a formal grant
of statutory authority.”).
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he finally called me up and said his name had been ‘dragged down in the mud
far enough,’ and that he would retire, and he did retire.”243

There is a legitimate debate about the effectiveness of these informal
mechanisms. For instance, when the issue of mandatory retirement ages for
federal judges was debated several decades ago, Judge Irving Kaufman wrote in
the Yale Law Journal that the problem of failing judicial health “can almost
always be managed effectively in a personal and informal manner. On occasion,
close colleagues of an afflicted judge suggest that he retire. If necessary, other
judges, attorneys, and even family members may approach the ailing jurist.
Almost invariably he will acquiesce.”244
My review that follows is not meant to evaluate the effectiveness of these
informal policing methods as compared to the formal methods, but rather to
evaluate whether the existing, informal system can be further improved. The
informal policing system relies on individual judges to (1) recognize their own
impairments and (2) take appropriate steps to leave the bench.245 But in the
general population, individuals often underestimate their cognitive decline, and
this happens to judges as well.246 Absent concrete evidence clearly showing the
decline, the chief judge, family, and friends must often rely on arm-twisting.247

a. How Informal Persuasion Works in Practice
Concerns about mental decline on the Supreme Court are longstanding.248
Historically, this challenge has been handled collegially.249 As political scientist
David Atkinson observes, “The chief justices have traditionally borne the
principal burden of dealing with incapacitated colleagues, which has all too
frequently proved to be trying.”250
A complicating factor for Supreme Court retirements is politics.251 Even
when a judge recognizes his/her cognitive impairment, political commitments
may motivate him/her.252 Justice William O. Douglas, for instance, once told a
former law clerk, “‘Even if I’m only half alive . . . I can still cast a liberal
243 Id. at 284 (alteration added) (quoting PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF
FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 416 (1973)).
244 Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 709 (1979).
245 David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical
Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 998 (2000) (“Questions of mental
incompetency have confronted the United States Supreme Court as far back as its very first
decade of existence.”).
246 See DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT THE
END 3 (1999).
247 See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 164, at 304.
248 See Garrow, supra note 245, at 995.
249 See ATKINSON, supra note 246, at 3.
250 Id.
251 See, e.g., id. at 8.
252 See, e.g., id.
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vote.’”253 Chief Justice William Howard Taft expressed a similar sentiment in
1929 in a letter to his brother:
I am older and slower and less acute and more confused. However . . . I
must stay on the court in order to prevent the Bolsheviki from getting
control . . . the only hope we have of keeping a consistent declaration of
constitutional law is for us to live as long as we can. 254

Whether it is because the judge doesn’t recognize his/her own decline,
because he/she wishes to stay despite the impairments, or for some other reason,
there are examples of judges who continued to serve even though their cognition
had significantly declined.255 The most extensive evidence comes from David
Garrow’s treatment, in which he concludes that “the history of the Court is
replete with repeated instances of justices casting decisive votes or otherwise
participating actively in the Court’s work when their colleagues and/or families
had serious doubts about their mental capacities.”256 Episodes of note include
the following:







Justice Nathan Clifford (1858–1881) suffered from mental illness at the
end of his tenure but could not be persuaded to resign in part because of
his political commitments.257
Justice Stephen Field’s (1863−1897) “mental condition was in
noticeable decline . . . [and] the other justices decided Field should be
urged to resign.”258 But even with the urging of Justice John Marshall
Harlan, Justice Field refused to resign until 1897.259
Justice Joseph McKenna’s (1898−1925) “mental alertness began to
decline,” but he did not resign.260 As a result, in 1924, the remaining
members of the Court decided “that no case would be decided because
of McKenna’s vote.”261
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes retired only after Justice Hughes
brought to his attention that his colleagues thought it best that he
retire.262 David Garrow rightly observes that “even what may have been
the single most distinguished career in the entire history of the United

253 Id.
254 Id. at 96.
255 For more extensive discussion, see Garrow, supra note 245, at 1011–12.
256 Id. at 995.
257 ATKINSON, supra note 246, at 59–60.
258 Id. at 69, 71.
259 Id.; Garrow, supra note 245, at 1009. Garrow observes that “little doubt exists that

Justice Field remained on the Court for at least two years beyond when his mental incapacity
should have prompted his retirement.” Id. at 1011.
260 ATKINSON, supra note 246, at 93.
261 Id. at 94.
262 Garrow, supra note 245, at 1018.
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States Supreme Court ended in an explicitly requested retirement
because of increasing mental decrepitude.”263
Justice Marshall’s final years included embarrassing mistakes during an
oral argument that gained national attention.264
Justice William O. Douglas experienced a stroke on December 31, 1974
and did not fully recover.265 Douglas “repeatedly addressed people at
the Court by their wrong names, often uttered nonsequiturs [sic] in
conversation or simply stopped speaking altogether.”266 But rather than
leave the Court, he stayed, and the rest of the Court (with the exception
of Byron White) agreed that they would not allow Douglas to render
votes.267

Examples such as these have led some commentators to call for reform in
judicial terms and retirement.268 In their argument in favor of introducing
Supreme Court term limits, Steven Calabresi and James Lindgren observed:
Of the twenty-three Justices who served longer than eighteen years and who
retired since 1897, fully eight (35%) were mentally or seriously physically
decrepit. Perhaps most stark is that nearly half of the last eleven Justices to

263 Id.
264 See Tony Mauro, Rehnquist Rumbles as Marshall Stumbles, LEGAL TIMES (Nov. 6,

1989).
265 Garrow, supra note 245, at 1052.
266 Id. at 1053.
267 Id. at 1054. Chief Justice Burger “was able to secure agreement to suspend the usual

certiorari procedure, which requires four votes to hear a case, when the fourth vote cast was
by Justice Douglas. Also, Justice Douglas’s vote was not allowed be decisive on any
important issue.” ATKINSON, supra note 246, at 174. Garrow further notes Justice White’s
displeasure with the decision of his colleagues to essentially (if informally) remove Douglas
from the court:
Justice White conspicuously declared that “I am convinced that it would have been
better had retirement been required at a specified age” by the Constitution and he
volunteered that “a constitutional amendment to that effect should be proposed and
adopted.” But in the absence of any such provision, White believed that
“[i]f the Court is convinced that Justice Douglas should not continue to function
as a Justice, the Court should say so publicly and invite Congress to take appropriate
action. If it is an impeachable offense for an incompetent Justice to purport to sit as a
judge, is it not the task of Congress, rather than of this Court, to undertake proceedings
to determine the issue of competence? If it is not an impeachable offense, may the Court
nevertheless conclude that a Justice is incompetent and forbid him to perform his
duties?”

Garrow, supra note 245, at 1055–56 (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Byron R.
White, Justice, to Warren E. Burger, Justice (Oct. 20, 1975) 1, in THE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.
PAPERS (on file with the Washington & Lee University School of Law Library)).
268 Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life
Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 772 (2006).
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leave office (45%) were mentally decrepit and half of the last six Justices to
leave office were mentally decrepit in their last years on the Court. 269

Moreover, Garrow found that “a thorough survey of Supreme Court
historiography reveals that mental decrepitude has been an even more frequent
problem on the twentieth-century Court than it was during the nineteenth.”270
One of the additional enabling factors in the modern era is the advent of
more law clerks for federal judges.271 These clerks may be taking on duties that
their old, ailing judge should be. David Lat, writing for Above the Law, recounts
just such an experience he observed with a fellow clerk:
When I clerked on the Ninth Circuit years ago, one of the judges on the
court at the time was extremely old—and didn’t seem very “with it.” His law
clerks seemed to take on a large amount of responsibility. One of his clerks that
year, a law school classmate of mine I’ll call “Mary,” would negotiate over the
phone with Ninth Circuit judges over how particular cases should come out—
a responsibility well beyond the legal research and opinion drafting done by
most clerks.
On one occasion, a vote on whether to rehear a case en banc emanated not
from the judge’s chambers account, but from Mary’s personal email account.
Even more embarrassingly, it was written not on behalf of the judge or the
chambers, but in the first person: “I vote YES to rehearing en banc.” A law
school classmate of mine who was also clerking for the Ninth that year
remarked, “I thought only judges did that. When did Mary get her presidential
commission?”272

To function, the modern system of informal checks requires a referee such
as Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook (7th Cir.), who has taken the lead in asking
colleagues to see neurologists when they show symptoms of memory loss.273
But such safeguards can fail. For example, a joint Slate/ProPublica
investigation found that Judge John Shabaz (Madison, WI) “had trouble reading
things out loud, such as plea agreements,” and that “[i]n August 2006, before
announcing a 20-year sentence, Shabaz forgot to offer a convicted drug dealer

269 Id. at 817.
270 Garrow, supra note 245, at 995.
271 See Trenton H. Norris, The

Judicial Clerkship Selection Process: An
Applicant’sPerspective on Bad Apples, Sour Grapes, and Fruitful Reform, 81 CALIF. L. REV.
765, 768 (1993) (“Since . . . the first law clerk was hired . . . clerking has grown to the status
of an institution. As the practice has gradually gained approval among federal
judges, . . . clerks have assumed increasingly influential roles.”).
272 David Lat, What Is to Be Done About Super-Old Judges?, ABOVE L. (Jan. 18, 2011),
https://abovethelaw.com/2011/01/what-is-to-be-done-about-super-old-judges/ [https:
//perma.cc/5BBN-2NK6].
273 Life Tenure for Federal Judges, supra note 4.
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the chance to ask for mercy.”274 The appellate court described this mistake as
“the kind of error that undermines the fairness of the judicial process.”275
These instances are of the sort that draw attention: memory loss, difficulty
speaking, noticeable lapse in concentration. But some symptoms of cognitive
decline are subtler and perhaps more pernicious.276 For instance, trial judges
must make hundreds of quick decisions about evidentiary objections, motions,
and courtroom order.277 At the trial court level, where a number of discretionary
decisions are made and never reviewed, it would be problematic if judges are
not as sharp as we want them to be.278
Yet systemic data about judicial cognitive decline does not exist, and there
are many examples where informal policing of judicial decline works.279 The
Breyer report noted the following report from a chief judge:
I did face problems of the aging process, that’s the most difficult by far to
deal with . . . . In most cases, the judge recognized it and got off the bench. But
not in all cases. I talked to family members. I got them to approach the judge.
You can’t slap a formal complaint at the end of his career on an 83-year old
judge who has rendered distinguished service . . . . I tried to approach that with
great delicacy, through family members. 280

The anecdotal evidence suggests that informal methods can work, but not
always, and that there is much variation from judge to judge.281 It seems likely
that informal conversations are often hampered by a lack of objective data with
which to present to the allegedly incompetent judge.

b. Judicial Wellness
Some courts have recently begun to promote judicial wellness and make
readily available to judges resources for brain health.282 The Ninth Circuit was
the first to establish procedures for providing education and counseling to judges

274 Id.
275 United States v. Luepke, 495 F.3d 443, 451 (7th Cir. 2007).
276 See Daniel L. Murman, The Impact of Age on Cognition, 36 SEMINARS HEARING 111,

117 (2015) (“The onset of cognitive decline is subtle and hard to determine.”).
277 See Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?,
29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 92 (2009).
278 Id.
279 See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONDUCT DISABILITY, supra note 236, at 102. On the other hand,
another said, “If using the family is a possibility, then you want to try that, but that’s a mixed
bag.” Id.
280 Id.
281 See id.
282 See FIX THE COURT, JUDICIAL WELLNESS AND BROADCAST MEDIA POLICIES IN
FEDERAL APPEALS COURTS (Feb. 2018) [hereinafter JUDICIAL WELLNESS].
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on the possibility of mental decline and other matters.283 Similar Wellness
Committees have now been established in the First, Third, Fifth, and Tenth
Circuits.284 In response to inquiries from the non-profit advocacy organization,
Fix the Court, many of these circuits noted that they are specifically focused on
issues related to aging judges.285
In describing the rationale for the Wellness Committee, Ninth Circuit Chief
Judge Phyllis Hamilton observed: “‘We’re an organization that is required to
police ourselves . . . If we wish to retain the goodwill and confidence of the
public in our ability to render justice by judges who are unimpaired . . . we have
to take steps.’”286
The Wellness Committee provides assistance and resources to struggling
jurists.287 The Wellness Committee has also made a Wellness Guide, now in its
fourth edition, accessible to the entire federal judiciary.288 The Wellness Guide
has a recommended list of steps for jurists to take when they begin to suspect
potential issues in a colleague’s ability to perform his/her duties due to mental
and/or physical impairment.289 These steps, broadly, are divided into
Recognition, Evaluation, Response, Case Management, and Communications
and Public Relations.290 The guide also provides a dedicated section on aging
and problems associated with it (e.g., Alzheimer’s), as well as articles and
resources on aging.291
There is limited evidence to suggest that judges have used Wellness
Committee resources.292 Calls to the Ninth Circuit’s judicial counseling hotline
were reported to fall into three categories:
Most are from chief judges seeking advice on how to deal with a judge or staff
member whose behavior has been problematic or whose health threatens
283 See Hobbs, supra note 165, at 823 (describing the Ninth Circuit’s “regular seminars

teaching the judges to recognize symptoms of cognitive decline” and “PALS,” its telephone
counseling service for judges and their family members).
284 See JUDICIAL WELLNESS, supra note 282.
285 See id.
286 Sudhin Thanawala, 9th Circuit Addresses Senility Among Federal Judges Head On,
MORNING J. (Nov. 7, 2015), https://www.morningjournal.com/news/th-circuit-address
es-senility-among-federal-judges-head-on/article_7a34bb87-67d8-5bdb-a4c7-5d01aa
c9eb0e.html [https://perma.cc/38EL-H56D].
287 Gabe Roth, How to Ensure Aging Federal Judges Remain Sharp, HILL (Jan. 20,
2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/369781-we-must-ensure-that-the-agingfederal-judiciary-remains-unimpaired [https://perma.cc/S8RG-F8WP].
288 WELLNESS COMM., NINTH CIRCUIT, A WELLNESS GUIDE FOR JUDGES OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT COURTS (rev. July 2015), https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2019/02/A-Wellness-Guide-for-Judges-of-the-Ninth-Circuit-Courts-Ninth-Circuit-Well
ness-Committee-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/997A-CLDM].
289 Id. at 2–15.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 15–16.
292 See JUDICIAL CONDUCT DISABILITY, supra note 236, at 105 (discussing the common
reasons why judges participate in counseling programs).
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performance. A second group of calls are from senior judges or their families,
seeking either information on dealing with chronic illness or, as to judges still
able to perform useful judicial work, on alternative living arrangements
because they can no longer live in their homes without assistance. A third group
of calls come from judges seeking some sort of treatment program to help deal
with a family or personal problem, such as marital conflict. 293

In sum, Wellness Committees could be a useful advance in addressing
judicial cognitive health.294 But, like other informal mechanisms, they
ultimately rely upon the judge’s own initiative and self-awareness to be
effective. As Atkinson observes based on his historical survey, “there is really
nothing the Court collectively can do to remove a colleague who is not amenable
to peer group pressure.”295
***
The federal judiciary has put in place several formal mechanisms to address
the issue of judicial cognitive decline.296 But the system still primarily relies on
informal mechanisms, now bolstered by wellness committees in many
circuits.297 The available evidence is incomplete, but it suggests that informal
approaches are not always successful in effectively identifying and removing
judges whose mental faculties are declining.298 This raises the question of
whether another system would be better in its place. The alternative often
suggested by commentators, and adopted by a majority of the states, is to
implement a mandatory judicial retirement age.299 In the next Part, I argue that
the mandatory retirement age is an inefficient and inequitable solution.

293 Id.
294 See id.
295 ATKINSON, supra note 246, at 72.
296 See JUDICIAL CONDUCT DISABILITY, supra note 236, at 6 (discussing the typical

process by which courts process formal complaints).
297 See id. at 7 (noting that informal efforts are the “principal means by which the judicial
branch deals with difficult problems of judicial misconduct and disability”).
298 See ATKINSON, supra note 246, at 72 (noting that “there is really nothing the Court
collectively can do to remove a colleague who is not amenable to peer group pressure”).
299 See William E. Raftery, Increasing or Repealing Mandatory Judicial Retirement
Ages, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. (2016), https://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites
/trends/home/monthly-trends-articles/2016/increasing-or-repealing-mandatory-judicialretirement-ages.aspx [https://perma.cc/P9MX-ZG2E] (noting that thirty-two states and the
District of Columbia have a mandatory retirement age for appellate or general jurisdiction
courts).
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V. MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGES FOR JUDGES AS AN INEFFICIENT
SOLUTION TO JUDICIAL COGNITIVE DECLINE
Longstanding debates continue about the value of mandatory judicial
retirement, at both the federal and state levels.300 Many of the critiques and
justifications are not directly related to the cognitive ability of the judges.301
Older judges are different from younger judges in many ways other than
cognitive ability.302 For instance: older judges grew up in a different culture,
and may judge with different cultural sensitivities than younger judges; older
judges are more distant in age from more youthful parties appearing in court;
and older judges, as a cohort, are less diverse along a variety of dimensions than
cohorts of younger judges.303 Here, I set aside those justifications for mandatory
retirement and focus narrowly on evaluating mandatory retirement ages with
respect to ensuring brain health in the judiciary.
Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have implemented
mandatory retirement ages for their judges,304 with eighteen states lacking
mandatory retirement ages.305 Appendix Table A1 provides a state-by-state
listing of the mandated judicial retirement age.306 Mandatory retirement ages
generally range from 70 to 75 years of age.307
Part A briefly summarizes the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and
constitutional challenges to state judicial mandatory retirement provisions. Part
B describes efforts to introduce mandatory retirement ages at the federal level.
300 See, e.g., id. (summarizing both sides of the debate on mandatory judicial retirement).

These debates often overlap with debates over judicial term limits. See, e.g., Judith Resnick,
Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO
L. REV. 579, 580 (2005).
301 See, e.g., Christopher R. McFadden, Judicial Independence, Age-Based BFOQs, and
the Perils of Mandatory Retirement Policies for Appointed State Judges, 52 S.C. L. REV. 81,
111 (2000) (noting that many support mandatory retirement because it might make the bench
younger and more diverse).
302 See id. (arguing that removing elderly judges could result in less ideological diversity
on the bench).
303 See Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (but Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in
the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 598–99 (2002) (arguing that racial and
gender diversity on the bench helps to challenge the status quo); McFadden, supra note 301,
at 111–12 (noting that census data suggests “that mandatory retirement ages will likely
remove seasoned minority and women judges from the bench prematurely”); Malia Reddick
et al., Racial and Gender Diversity on State Courts: An AJS Study, 48 JUDGES’ J. 28, 29
(2009) (arguing that mandatory retirement ages disadvantage female and minority judges).
304 Raftery, supra note 299.
305 Most States Require Judges to Step Down After 70, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., https://
www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/Backgrounder/2010/Mandatory-Retirement.aspx [https://per
ma.cc/8XQ3-93NB]. These states are Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Id.
306 See SHEN, APPENDIX, supra note 57.
307 Id.
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Part C critiques mandatory judicial retirement ages as out of step with current
scientific understanding of the aging brain.

A. Legal Challenges to State Mandated Judicial Retirement Age
Mandatory retirement became prominent in American society in late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.308 The question of mandatory
retirement in the United States continued to be debated in the 1950s,309 but by
the 1960s and 1970s, many older adults worked in industries with mandatory
retirement ages.310
In response, Congress, through the Civil Rights Act of 1964, directed the
Secretary of Labor to “make a full and complete study of the factors which might
tend to result in discrimination in employment because of age and of the
consequences of such discrimination on the economy and the individuals
affected.”311 In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, in which “individuals who [were] between 40 and 65 years of age [were to
be protected] from discrimination in employment.”312 By 1978, Congress had
“outlawed mandatory retirement before the age of 70” through the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978 (ADEA).313 Through
the ADEA, Congress also “rais[ed] the private-sector age of coverage from 65
to 70 and remove[d] the age cap for federal employees to cover individuals age
40 and older.”314 Eventually, the age of coverage cap at 70 was also removed
with the Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986,315
“abolish[ing] [mandatory retirement] altogether.”316
308 Carole Haber, Mandatory Retirement in Nineteenth-Century America: The
Conceptual Basis for a New Work Cycle, 12 J. SOC. HIST. 77, 81 (1978). According to
historian Carole Haber, “retirement is a relatively new development in American society,”
with the period of the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century representing a
turning point in the “prescribed roles for the old.” Id. at 77.
309 See generally Stanley C. Hope, Should There Be a Fixed Retirement Age? Some
Managements Say Yes, 279 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72 (1952) (listing the
advantages of mandatory retirement from the perspective of employees, management, and
other 1950s stakeholders).
310 See Till Von Wachter, The End of Mandatory Retirement in the US: Effects on
Retirement and Implicit Contracts 1 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Ctr. for Labor Econs., Working
Paper No. 49, 2002) (noting that in the 1960s and 1970s, 40% to 50% of the population
worked in industries with mandatory retirement ages).
311 ADEA and Amendments, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/adea50th/adea.cfm [https://perma.cc/YQ7W-YMEL]
(quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 715, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (July 2,
1964)).
312 Id. (alteration added).
313 Von Wachter, supra note 310, at 1.
314 ADEA and Amendments, supra note 311 (alterations added).
315 Id.
316 Von Wachter, supra note 310, at 1. The 1986 ADEA “provide[d] an exemption
through 1993 for state and local governments using maximum hiring or mandatory
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Until the Supreme Court ruled on the issue in 1991, there was considerable
debate about whether a state’s imposition of a mandatory retirement age for
judges violated the ADEA.317 But in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that Missouri’s mandatory judicial retirement age of 70 violated
neither the ADEA nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.318
In Gregory, Justice O’Connor recognized the “authority of the people of the
States to determine the qualifications of their most important government
officials.”319 Since older adults are not a “suspect class” of individuals, the
heightened standard of “strict scrutiny” was not required.320
Since Gregory v. Ashcroft, there have been periodic calls for raising the
mandatory retirement age for judges,321 and in recent years, some states have
explored raising the age.322 There have also been renewed attempts to challenge
state mandatory retirement laws. In 2016, Minnesota Judge Galen Vaa
challenged the constitutionality of Minnesota’s mandatory judicial retirement

retirement ages for firefighters or law enforcement officials.” ADEA and Amendments, supra
note 311 (also providing an exemption for colleges and universities “who may involuntarily
retire professors at age 70, if the professor is serving under a contract of unlimited tenure”).
Over a decade later, the Higher Education Amendments of 1998 amended Section 4 of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act in order to “permit colleges and universities to offer
special age-based retirement incentives for tenured faculty members at institutions of higher
education.” Id.
317 See, e.g., Alan L. Bushlow, Note, Mandatory Retirement of State-Appointed Judges
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 476, 478 (1991);
Thomas Alden Hauser, Note, Mandatory Retirement of State Judges and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 973, 994 (1990); McFadden, supra
note 301, at 134; Laura A. Popovitch, Comment, EEOC v. State of Vermont: Are Appointed
State Judges “Employees” under the ADEA?, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 698 (1990); Tina
E. Sciocchetti, Comment, Mandatory Retirement of Appointed State Judges—Age
Discrimination?, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 866, 869 (1991); Darlene M. Severson, Note, Mandatory
Retirement of Judges: Law and Policy—Gregory v. Ashcroft, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
858, 859 (1991); Lawrence A. Walke, Comment, Extending Protection under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to Appointed State Judges, EEOC v. State of Vermont,
904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990), 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 359, 359 (1991).
318 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991).
319 Id. at 463, 472 (“The people of Missouri have a legitimate, indeed compelling,
interest in maintaining a judiciary fully capable of performing the demanding tasks that
judges must perform. It is an unfortunate fact of life that physical and mental capacity
sometimes diminish with age. The people may therefore wish to replace some older judges.
Voluntary retirement will not always be sufficient. Nor may impeachment—with its public
humiliation and elaborate procedural machinery—serve acceptably the goal of a fully
functioning judiciary.”).
320 Id. at 470.
321 See, e.g., Scott Makar, In Praise of Older Judges: Raise the Mandatory Retirement
Age?, 71 FLA. B.J. 48, 48 (1997).
322 See, e.g., Gen. Assemb. Con. Res. No. 122, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018).
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age of 70,323 but the State’s motion to dismiss was granted and his appeal
denied.324
In 2018, Michigan Judge Michael Theile argued that Michigan’s
constitutional requirement that judges not be elected after age 70 violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.325
The district court, despite finding against him, was sympathetic: “In his
complaint and in the brief filed in support of his motion for summary judgment,
plaintiff argues eloquently that age-based classifications such as this are
irrational.”326 A three-judge panel on the Sixth Circuit was also sympathetic to
Theile’s argument, stating: “One may well sympathize with Theile’s assertions
that the age 70 limit is ‘archaic,’ and that ‘it is wrong indiscriminately to put
people to pasture.’”327 But the court went on to note that “[r]ational basis review
does not assess the wisdom of the challenged regulation.”328 A Sixth Circuit
decision eighteen years earlier had previously found Michigan’s judicial age
limit rationally related to many purposes, including “preserving the competency
of the judiciary” and “promoting judicial efficiency and reducing partisan
appointments of judges.”329 The Sixth Circuit did not agree with Theile’s
argument that “the laws and facts have changed so significantly in the decades
since” that the previous reasoning was now unsound.330

B. Efforts to Implement a Mandatory Retirement Age for Federal
Judges
Although unsuccessful, there have been multiple attempts to legislate
mandatory retirement ages for federal judges.331 As former Chief Justice of
323 Vaa v. State, No. A17-0489, 2017 WL 3974321, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 11,

2017).
324 Id. at *4.
325 Theile v. Michigan, 891 F.3d 240, 242 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Breck v. Michigan, 203

F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 2000)).
326 Theile v. Michigan, No. 17-CV-12066, 2017 WL 6504009, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 4,
2017), aff’d, 891 F.3d 240 (6th Cir. 2018).
327 Theile, 891 F.3d at 244.
328 Id. (quoting Breck, 203 F.3d at 395).
329 Breck, 203 F.3d at 397.
330 Theile, 891 F.3d at 245.
331 See Garrow, supra note 245, at 996 (noting that there have been “three different
occasions over the past sixty-five years” on which members of Congress have attempted to
institute mandatory judicial retirement ages); see also Robert Kramer & Jerome A. Barron,
The Constitutionality of Removal and Mandatory Retirement Procedures for the Federal
Judiciary: The Meaning of “During Good Behavior,” 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 467–71
(1967) (discussing the constitutionality of mandatory retirement for federal judges). Many
have also proposed reforms that would eliminate life tenure and replace it with term limits.
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court: An
Introduction, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 11
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) (providing an overview of various
arguments); see also Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 268, at 772 (proposing an eighteen-

2020]

AGING JUDGES

279

Texas Robert W. Calvert once noted, “[T]here is no sound basis for concluding
that state judges age, become tired and grow out-of-touch, but that federal
judges do not.”332 David Garrow provides a detailed history of these efforts at
imposing a federal mandatory retirement age, noting that “on three different
occasions over the past sixty-five years, members of Congress have surmounted
conventional wisdom and confronted the danger of mental decrepitude[.]”333 I
mention here only some of the key moments.
In the late 1940s, the American Bar Association (ABA) led an effort to
galvanize support for mandatory judicial retirement at age 75.334 In 1954,
through the sponsorship of Maryland Senator John Marshall Butler, the issue
was debated on the Senate Floor.335 “Butler explained that ‘[i]t is the consensus
of authoritative opinion that some limit should be placed on service and that the
age of 75 strikes the happy medium between experience and senility.’”336 The
amendment passed the Senate but died in the House Judiciary Committee.337
In 1965, the ABA again offered recommendations to explore “compulsory
retirement of judges with permanent physical or mental disabilities.”338 The
ABA worked with Maryland Democratic Senator Joseph D. Tydings in 1968
and 1969 to advance legislation.339 The issue arose again in the mid-1970s when
Georgia Senator Sam Nunn took up the mantle and proposed legislation that
would have provided mandatory retirement ages for all federal judges, including
the Supreme Court.340 Notably:
year term limit on Supreme Court justices); James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Saving
this Honorable Court: A Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with
Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-Year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093, 1096–97 (2004)
(arguing that eighteen-year term limits on Supreme Court justices would limit the
politicization of the Court while preserving judicial independence).
332 Garrow, supra note 245, at 1058.
333 Id. at 996.
334 Id. at 1031–32 (“The measure’s proponents were undaunted, and in mid-December
the New York City Bar committee sponsored a speech endorsing its proposals by retired
Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts. Justice Roberts’s speech was published as the lead
article in the very next month’s American Bar Association Journal, and thereby gave the
proposals far and away the widest publicity they had yet received. Regarding mandatory
retirement at age seventy-five, Roberts called it ‘a wise provision. First of all, it will forestall
the basis of the last attack on the Court, the extreme age of the justices, and the fact that
superannuated old gentlemen hung on there long after their usefulness had ceased.’”).
335 Id. at 1034, 1037.
336 Id. at 1040.
337 Id. at 1041.
338 Report of the Standing Committee on Judicial Selection, Tenure and Compensation,
90 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 446, 446–47 (1966); Report of the Section of Judicial Administration,
90 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 587, 587–88 (1966).
339 Garrow, supra note 245, at 1057.
340 Id. at 1059 (“[I]n October 1974 . . . Georgia Democratic Senator Sam Nunn
introduced a bill that expanded upon Tydings’s 1969 measure to include Supreme Court
justices as well. Nunn reintroduced his bill as S 1110 in the new Congress in March 1975,
and the very next day Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and the United States Judicial
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Nunn’s bill specifically proposed that for any federal judge or justice who was
eligible for retirement . . . if a majority of the Judicial Conference found “that
such Justice or judge is unable to discharge efficiently one or more of the
critical duties of his office by reason of a permanent mental or physical
disability, the Conference shall certify the disability of such Justice or judge
and issue an order removing such Justice or judge from active
service . . . . Such Justice or judge shall then be involuntarily retired from
regular active service.”341

But Senator Nunn’s efforts ultimately failed as well.342

C. Mandatory Judicial Retirement Ages and Cognitive Decline
With regard to cognitive decline, the fundamental arguments against
mandatory judicial retirement ages, both of which were made by Judge Theile
in his 2018 Michigan challenge, are that (1) some of the judges younger than
the retirement age may be in decline, and there is little protection against
cognitive decline prior to the retirement age; and (2) some of the judges older
than the retirement age are not experiencing cognitive decline and have no
opportunity to rebut the presumption that they are mentally unfit to serve.343
There is no access to systematic judicial health data, so analysis remains
necessarily speculative.
It is also important to note that there is some evidence suggesting that
experience on the bench improves judging outcomes,344 and that “judges who
last longer on the job tend to be better than those who retire earlier.”345
Conference announced their support for a somewhat narrower approach that would police
‘mental disability’ and other shortcomings among lower federal court judges but would not
cover justices of the Supreme Court.”) (footnotes omitted).
341 Id. at 1059–60 (quoting 121 CONG. REC. 5609, 5721 (1975)).
342 Id. at 1065 (“From the perspective of the Supreme Court’s extensive history with
mentally decrepit justices, Senator Nunn’s well intentioned but constitutionally questionable
initiative in the end brought forth no reform or protection whatsoever.”).
343 See “Corrected” Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at *23–28, Theile v. Michigan, 891 F.3d
240 (6th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2275), 2017 WL 6210343. Theile phrased his argument as
follows:
The current laws are capricious, unjustified and irrational for these indisputable material
facts . . . . For every judge who should be removed due to some age-related disability
or problem, there are many qualified judges who should not be removed. . . . These
arguments for mandatory retirement fail to consider the value of a judge’s accumulated
wisdom and experience on the bench, and that each person ages differently.

Id.
344 See Benjamin Iverson et al., Learning by Doing: Judge Experience and Bankruptcy
Outcomes 7 (Nov. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that
judicial experience “play[s] an important role in determining large Chapter 11 [bankruptcy]
outcomes”).
345 Elliott Ash & Bentley MacLeod, Aging, Retirement, and High-Skill Work
Performance: The Case of State Supreme Court Judges 41 (Dec. 18, 2017) (unpublished
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To start, there is no published neuroscientific research suggesting that a
particular age (sixty, sixty-five, seventy-five, and so on) should serve as the
bright line cutoff for cognitive decline.346 In fact, the literature is clear that at
older ages there is wider individual variation in cognitive abilities.347 Notably,
there are some fifty-year-olds who perform worse than some eighty-year-olds
(and vice versa).348 Bright line age rules are not sensitive to such variation.
An additional concern is that the correlation between age and the judicial
functional capacity is not clear, even at a group average level.349 Atkinson is
right that “whether a justice should retire at age sixty-five or seventy or seventyfive does not satisfactorily resolve the basic issue of competence.”350 Certainly,
as I discussed above, there are many anecdotes of older judges displaying
worrisome cognitive decline.351 But we could also fill pages with anecdotes of
older judges performing their duties wonderfully.352
One example is legendary U.S. District Judge Jack Weinstein.353 At age
ninety-six, Judge Weinstein is still productive and writing notable opinions.354
He annually undergoes a neurological evaluation,355 and observes that “[m]y
memory is not as acute as it was, [but] principles, I know, and my judgment is
the same—it may be better.”356 A bright line rule of mandatory retirement at
age seventy-five would have deprived the country of the past twenty years of
Judge Weinstein’s opinions.
Another way in which mandatory retirement ages are at odds with
neuroscience research is the gender-uniformity of the age cut-offs. There is
manuscript) (on file with author). However, it is unclear how the quality of opinions varies
with age, as different outcome measures produce different results. See id. at 3–4 (noting that
quantifiable judicial outputs are affected by “many factors external to the judge”).
346 See Rogalski et al., supra note 107, at 30 (noting that many individuals over the age
of eighty retain cognitive abilities comparable to individuals in their fifties or sixties).
347 Id.
348 Id. (“Increase in the magnitude of interindividual variation in memory performance
over the life span. Gray shading reflects ±1SD from the mean and demonstrates the widening
of the standard deviation over the life span due to higher interindividual variation in aging.
Triangles represent elite performers who may be immune to the common age related declines
in episodic memory. Circles represent individual data. Lines represent averages for 35–49,
50–59, 60–69, and 70–85 from left to right, respectively.”).
349 See Ash & MacLeod, supra note 345, at 4 (noting that older judges typically write
higher quality opinions at a similar volume than their younger colleagues).
350 ATKINSON, supra note 246, at 168.
351 See supra Part IV.B.
352 See, e.g., Alan Feuer, The 96-Year-Old Brooklyn Judge Standing Up to the Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/nyregion/the96-year-old-brooklyn-judge-standing-up-to-the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc
/CSP4-JDZE].
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Life Tenure for Federal Judges, supra note 4 (“Judge Weinstein of Brooklyn gets an
annual neurological checkup, including a CAT scan.”).
356 Id. (alterations in original).
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growing evidence that female brains age at a different rate than male brains.357
Although it is not yet entirely clear what explains these differences, the evidence
suggest that “throughout the adult life span the typical female brain is more
youthful.”358 Mandatory retirement is perhaps not only ageist, but also sexist in
its lack of recognition that older female judges may, on average, have more
youthful brains than their male colleagues.359
Finally, in addition to concerns that a bright-line rule excludes older judges
who would still perform very well on the bench, there is a parallel concern that
the bright-line approach doesn’t solve the issue of cognitive decline before the
mandatory retirement age. Consider the following anecdote.
In Chicago in 2016, fifty-nine-year-old Cook County Judge Valarie Turner
made local headlines for erratic behavior in her courtroom. 360 Judge Turner had
a tremendous legal pedigree: she was a graduate of the University of Chicago
and worked at Kirkland & Ellis before joining the bench in 2002.361 But in the
summer of 2016, she exhibited erratic behavior in chambers.362 Most notably,
she allowed an attorney to wear the judicial robe and preside over cases.363
Immediately after this incident, the chief judge in the county removed her from
the bench.364 She subsequently underwent medical evaluations, and was
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease.365 Mandatory retirement ages do little to
address situations such as Judge Turner’s, when cognitive decline happens
before the mandatory retirement age.
Moreover, this case raises an important point about the need for dignified
procedures. The Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board found Judge Turner “mentally
unable” to do her work, and when the Board filed a formal complaint to the
Illinois Courts Commission, her attorney was critical.366 In the attorney’s view:
Ms. Turner is charged with no misconduct. She therefore has done nothing that
would justify any sanction that could be imposed by the commission. In
357 See Manu S. Goyal et al., Persistent Metabolic Youth in the Aging Female Brain, 116
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 3251, 3251 (2019) (“Prior work has identified many sex
differences in the brain, including during brain aging and in neurodegenerative diseases.”).
358 Id. at 3253.
359 See id. at 3251 (noting that “in terms of brain metabolism, the adult female brain is
on average a few years younger than the male brain”).
360 See Steve Mills & Todd Lighty, Cook County Judge Who Let Clerk Hear Cases Is
Deemed ‘Mentally Unable’ to Do Job, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/breaking/ct-cook-county-judge-mentally-unfit-memory-loss-20161202
-story.html [https://perma.cc/29NM-VEHM].
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Steve Mills & Todd Lighty, Judge Removed After Allegedly Allowing Lawyer to
Hear Cases, Wear Robe, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/breaking/ct-judge-lawyer-substitute-met-20160817-story.html [https://perma.cc
/H8FY-DFGK].
364 Id.
365 Mills & Lighty, supra note 360.
366 Id.
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essence, the Judicial Inquiry Board has charged her only with having
Alzheimer’s disease. This sets a terrible precedent for any judge who, like Ms.
Turner, has an illness that she did not cause and cannot control. 367

The attorney’s critique highlights the lack of support structures and
procedures for handling cognitive decline and raises fundamental questions
about the fairness of using judicial misconduct mechanisms to address agerelated cognitive decline in judges.
***
Mandatory retirement ages for judges may serve other useful purposes, but
they are a suboptimal solution for responding to age-related cognitive decline.
The nature and rate of change in cognitive abilities vary significantly across
individuals, and this variation is not accounted for in systems that rely entirely
on mandatory retirement ages as the bulwark against dementia on the bench. As
I will discuss in the next Part, the introduction of individualized cognitive
assessment offers a more promising alternative.

VI. A PATH FORWARD: TOWARD INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENT OF
JUDICIAL COGNITIVE CAPACITY
This Part lays out a vision for the development of a judicial cognitive
assessment toolbox for judges. Before making my affirmative proposal, I
emphasize three things that I am not proposing.
First, I am not arguing that the federal system should adopt the proposed
cognitive assessment as a screening device. Indeed, I emphasize that the results
of the assessment should not be shared with anyone other than the judge. My
proposal is that the cognitive assessment be integrated into the existing federal
system. Second, and relatedly, I am not arguing that a single brain scan should
be dispositive of a judge’s future on the bench. Neuroimaging should be
included in the toolbox of assessment tools, but the translation of biomarkers
into judicial functional capacity requires careful consideration of many
behavioral data points in addition to the brain imaging. Third, I am not
suggesting that implementation of these tools should happen immediately. I
suggest instead that the development of a judicial capacity evaluation system
must be carried out with great care. The most immediate next step should be the
development of an interdisciplinary research group to produce a consensus
report on best practices and best tools to employ for assessing judicial cognitive
health.
Part A frames the discussion by gleaning lessons from the development of
regulations for cognitive testing for commercial airline pilots and for aging
physicians. Part B then transitions to law, laying out some basic principles that
the testing should accomplish. Part C reviews a variety of neuropsychological
367 Id.
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tests that may be of use. Part D discusses emerging neuroscientific biomarkers
for Alzheimer’s. Part E presents a plan for development and implementation of
a judicial capacity toolbox. I emphasize the need for input across disciplines and
stakeholders in developing this toolbox.

A. Learning from Similar Contexts in Other Professions
Judges are not the only professionals who are aging and confronting the
possibility of cognitive testing. In crafting a solution for judges, I start by
reviewing what can be learned from the experiences of airline pilots and
physicians. What can be seen in both instances is that resistance to an
individualized testing regime is rooted in a concern that the proper testing
tool/technology for individualized assessment does not exist.

1. Aging Airline Pilots
My proposed solution below draws upon wisdom generated by the airline
pilot screening program implemented via federal law. In 1958, Congress passed
the “Federal Aviation Act,” directing the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to (amongst other things) consider “the duty of an air carrier to provide
service with the highest possible degree of safety” when issuing an airman
certificate, air carrier certificate, or other certificate.368 In 1959, the FAA
subsequently set the “Age 60 Rule,”369 which stated that “an airline pilot, at the
age of 60, must discontinue flying aircraft used to carry passengers in airline
operations.”370 This meant that “an airline pilot who reaches the age of 60 must
retire without regard to his or her excellent health and continued ability to
fly.”371 In generating the rule, the FAA noted that “available medical studies
show that sudden incapacitation due to heart attacks or strokes becomes more
frequent as men approach age sixty and present medical knowledge is such that
it is impossible to predict with accuracy those individuals most likely to suffer
attacks.”372 The age restriction was quickly challenged, with the plaintiff pilots
arguing that “the age sixty limitation is arbitrary and discriminatory and without
relation to any requirements of safety.”373 But the Second Circuit found that the
age of 60 was reasonable, given the available evidence.374

368 49 U.S.C. § 44701(d) (2018).
369 Fred Tilton, Should the FAA Change Its Age-60 Rule?, 44 FED. AIR SURGEON’S MED.

BULL. 2 (2006).
370 Michael R. Kasperzak, Mandatory Retirement of Airline Pilots: An Analysis of the
FAA’s Age 60 Retirement Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 241 (1981).
371 Id.
372 Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1960).
373 Id.
374 Id.
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The Age 60 Rule has been challenged on other occasions.375 In 1970, the
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) requested that the FAA revoke the Age 60
Rule, and instead replace it with individualized tests of performance.376 The
FAA decided to retain the Age 60 Rule, and again a court challenge failed
because the FAA’s rulemaking was deemed reasonable given the available
evidence.377
There were two justifications for the Age 60 Rule. The first was that pilots
might be more likely to die suddenly while controlling the plane in flight.378
That is not relevant to the judiciary concern—a judge who dies in the middle of
a trial may cause trauma to those who witness it, but the legal machinery is in
place to readily keep proceedings moving at a future date.379 The second
concern for pilots, however, is closely tied to the judicial concern: through an
“increased probability of subtle incapacitation that would lead to errors or
slowing in perceptual, cognitive, and psychomotor function, and thus
compromise safe pilot performance.”380
The Age 60 Rule was again scrutinized in 1979, when Congress directed
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and in turn the National Academies, to
examine whether age 60 was an appropriate cut-off age.381 I offer a close
examination of this National Academies Report because it serves as a useful
model for the careful, interdisciplinary research required to develop a new
toolbox on judicial cognitive aging. The preface to the National Academies
Report frames the issue well:
In the 21 years since the regulation was adopted, it has been repeatedly
challenged as unjustified. Those in favor of the rule, however, contend that
persons whose jobs directly involve the public safety, such as airline pilots, bus
drivers, firemen, and air traffic controllers bear the burden of proving that
increasing their retirement age will not jeopardize the public safety.382

375 See Geneve DuBois, The Age 60 Rule–It Is Time to Defeat It!, 70 J. AIR L. & COM.
319, 321 (2005) (discussing attempts to challenge the Age 60 Rule in court or remove it
through legislation).
376 See O’Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 60–61 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
377 Id. at 60.
378 DIV. OF HEALTH SCI. POLICY, INST. OF MED., AIRLINE PILOT AGE, HEALTH, AND
PERFORMANCE: SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS 128 (1981).
379 See Neil Stern, Death or Disability of Judges in Civil Litigation—Substitution under
Federal Rule 63, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1125 (1983) (noting that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 63 provides for the discretionary substitution of judges in the event of their death
or disability).
380 DIV. OF HEALTH SCI. POLICY, supra note 378, at 128.
381 Id. at 2 (“The NIH, through the National Institute on Aging, requested that the
National Academy of Sciences/Institute of Medicine establish a committee to provide an
objective examination, summary, and assessment of scientific knowledge on medical and
behavioral aspects of aging and pilot performance and to indicate the extent to which valid
conclusions can be reached for the questions of PL 96-171.”).
382 Id. at xiii.
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The National Academies report found that “[f]or significant acute events
(such as cardiovascular events and stroke), age 60 does not mark the beginning
of a special risk or a special increase in risk,”383 but also that “[a]vailable
evidence suggests that on the average at least some of the skills necessary for
the highest level of safety deteriorate with age” and that “there is great variation
among individuals in any age group.”384
In the end, the National Academies took a middle position. On one hand, it
was clear that “[i]n its assessment of relevant biomedical and behavioral
research, the committee found that variability within an age group is often nearly
as great as variability among age groups, and that usually no single age emerges
as a point of sharp decline in function.”385 On the other hand, however, it
recognized that individual tests to determine functional capacity were not
readily available.386 Ultimately the report concluded that a new test was needed,
and that an optimal test would examine functional capacity, in order to “detect
changes in performance that are operationally significant and may be more
likely to occur among older pilots[.]”387
The issue of individualized testing arose again in the early 1980s.388 At that
time, the FAA considered a temporary modification to the Rule, in which pilots
over age sixty would be allowed to fly in order that the FAA could collect data
on this new cohort—and thus determine if risks increased after age sixty.389 The
FAA decided not to pursue this modified rule, however, largely based on the
perceived inability to conduct accurate individual-level assessment of functional
capacity.390 The FAA wrote that:
There simply are insufficient means of accurately testing whether
individual pilots will become incapacitated to gather data sufficient to support
a determination on the age 60 rule. As the Medical Director of a large aerospace
firm states: “Until more precise methods of detecting physiological changes
brought on by aging are developed, no program of data gathering or physical
examination will provide meaningful information.”391

In the early 1990s, the same cycle repeated itself. This time, a new study
found that there was “no hint of an increase in the accident rate for pilots of
383 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
384 Id. at 4. The report also concluded that “[a]ttention, memory, and ability to solve

problems and make decisions alter with age. There may be changes in speed, capacity, or
accuracy. However, variations among individuals are great, and performance decrements are
not readily apparent for well-practiced skills.” Id. at 9.
385 Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
386 DIV. OF HEALTH SCI. POLICY, supra note 378, at 135.
387 Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
388 See generally Flight Crewmembers; Limitations on Use of Services, 49 Fed. Reg.
14,692, 14,692–93 (Apr. 12, 1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 121).
389 Id. at 14,693.
390 Id.
391 Id.
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scheduled air carriers as they near their 60th birthday.”392 The FAA held public
hearings, but in 1995 decided to stick with the Age 60 Rule, concluding that
“[a]fter considering all comments and known studies, FAA concludes that
concerns regarding aging pilots and underlying the original rule have not been
shown to be invalid or misplaced.”393 Subsequent further legal challenges, on
the basis of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) also failed.394
Failing to generate change via agency rulemaking and the courts, lobbyists
and interest groups turned their attention to Congress. In 2007, Congress passed
the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act, which stated that “a pilot may
serve in multicrew covered operations until attaining 65 years of age.”395 While
advocates applauded the change, it didn’t address the lingering question of
individual capacity.396 As one commenter on the Act remarked, a retirement age
of sixty-five is “just as arbitrary as age sixty.”397 Thus, although the age was
raised for airline pilots, the idea of assessing functional capacity on an individual
level was tabled.

2. Aging Physicians
Similar to judges, doctors in America are getting older, and many are no
longer retiring at the traditional age of sixty-five.398 There is also evidence

392 The Age 60 Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,336, 21,336 (Apr. 20, 1993) (to be codified at 14

C.F.R. pt. 121).
393 The Age 60 Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,977, 65,980 (Dec. 20, 1995) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 121).
394 Prof’l Pilots Fed’n v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
395 49 U.S.C. § 44729 (2012) (emphasis added). For discussion of the policy process
leading to this legislation, which followed a policy change enacted by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), see Nicholas D. O’Conner, Too Experienced for the Flight
Deck? Why the Age 65 Rule Is Not Enough, 17 ELDER L.J. 375, 385–88 (2009).
396 See O’Conner, supra note 395, at 375. Moreover, the National Academies also
emphasized the need to improve cognitive testing in the FAA program, reporting that
“[t]esting of cognitive function (information processing and intellectual functioning) does
not fall within the domain of the aviation medical examiner, but it should be addressed in the
determination of whether the FAA-mandated examination is adequate to detect decrements
in functioning past age 60.” DIV. OF HEALTH SCI. POLICY, supra note 378, at 134. However,
psychological evaluations are not mandatory for airline pilots. Paul Hoversten, How Are
Airline Pilots Tested for Mental Health?, AIR & SPACE MAG. (Mar. 27, 2012),
https://www.airspacemag.com/need-to-know/how-are-airline-pilots-tested-for-mental
-health-167046164/ [https://perma.cc/CRK5-T53E].
397 Jeff Orkin, Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act—All Good Things Really Do
Come to an End!, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 579, 599 (2008).
398 Krista L. Kaups, Competence Not Age Determines Ability to Practice: Ethical
Considerations about Sensorimotor Agility, Dexterity, and Cognitive Capacity, 18 AMA J.
ETHICS 1017, 1017 (2016).
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suggesting that cognitive impairment is likely for some older physicians.399
Thus, physicians find themselves in a similar situation as judges; no mandatory
retirement for a growing number of older physicians400—some of whom very
likely are experiencing cognitive decline that may affect their performance.
The medical community is actively debating whether informal mechanisms
of policing are sufficient.401 It has been found that “adaptive thinking and
critical reasoning,” “processing speed,” “episodic memory,” “hearing, visual
acuity, depth perception, colour discrimination and manual dexterity” are all
“age-related sensory and cognitive changes” that affect the aging process, and
work, of doctors.402 “Skill, ability to discern and memory” are crucial tools for
surgeons throughout their careers, but they all tend to deteriorate with age.403
One of the concerns is that the evidence suggests that physicians’ selfevaluations of their skills may overestimate their competence as compared to
objective testing.404
In June 2018, a group of physicians published an article that drew
considerable attention: Cognitively Impaired Physicians: How Do We Detect
Them? How Do We Assist Them?405 The authors made a series of observations
similar to those made about judges:

399 Richard Hyer, Cognitive Impairment in Older Physicians May Be Widespread,

MEDSCAPE (May 9, 2006), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/532007 [https://
perma.cc/L8M8-HMQ3].
400 Ralph B. Blasier, The Problem of the Aging Surgeon: When Surgeon Age Becomes a
Surgical Risk Factor, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 402, 402 (2009).
401 See, e.g., N.R. Bhatt et al., When Should Surgeons Retire?, 103 BRIT. J. SURGERY 35,
35 (2015) (exploring “the effects of ageing on surgeons’ performance, and [identifying]
current practical methods for transitioning surgeons out of practice at the appropriate time
and age”); Kevin W. Eva, The Aging Physician: Changes in Cognitive Processing and Their
Impact on Medical Practice, 77 ACAD. MED. S1 (2002) (examining how diagnosticians
approach clinical cases like physician review programs); Kaups, supra note 398, at 1019–21
(describing formal mechanisms for regulation, such as licensing, certification, and
credentialing); Robert T. Sataloff et al., The Aging Physician and Surgeon, 95 EAR NOSE &
THROAT J. 129 (2016) (reviewing approaches to assessing physicians’ cognitive functions
and noting that no evaluation system has been standardized); Ronnie Cohen, Should Older
Doctors Be Examined, Tested or Forced to Retire?, REUTERS HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 11,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcare-physician-retirement/should-olderdoctors-be-examined-tested-or-forced-to-retire-idUSKBN1AR22K [https://perma.cc/2L6EKGTS] (“The report in JAMA Surgery recommends that healthcare organizations develop
protocols for testing doctors of a certain—though undetermined—age for health and
competence.”).
402 George A. Skowronski & Carmelle Peisah, The Greying Intensivist: Ageing and
Medical Practice—Everyone’s Problem, 196 MED. J. AUSTL. 505, 505–06 (2012).
403 Bhatt et al., supra note 401, at 35.
404 David A. Davis et al., Accuracy of Physician Self-Assessment Compared with
Observed Measures of Competence: A Systematic Review, 296 JAMA 1094, 1100 (2006).
405 Anothai Soonsawat et al., Cognitively Impaired Physicians: How Do We Detect
Them? How Do We Assist Them?, 26 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 631, 631 (2018).
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There are more older physicians: “Many physicians continue to practice
into their 70s and 80s as a consequence of professional satisfaction,
increased life expectancy, concerns regarding financial security, and
reluctance to retire.”406
There are benefits from experience: “[A] physician’s effectiveness can
be enhanced through acquisition and refinement of experience,
knowledge, patient management skills, and clinical judgment.”407
There are also, on average, age-related deficits: “In physicians as in all
adults, cognitive decline is acknowledged to be a consequence of aging.
Extensive evidence documents age-associated neuropathologic brain
changes that are manifested in cognitive changes . . . Aging affects
multiple domains of cognitive functioning relevant to physicians’
professional performance.”408

Faced with this new landscape, a number of physicians are now advocating
for more regular competence testing.409 The American College of Emergency
Physicians (ACEP) has pursued the “concept of senior career development.”410
In 2009, the ACEP Board of Directors approved a set of guidelines that were
developed to “enhance and prolong the careers of emergency physicians in the
latter stages of their professional lives, to ensure patient safety, to promote
continued membership and participation in the College, and to facilitate the
transition of emergency physicians from active practice to semi- or full
retirement.”411
The American College of Surgeons in 2016 issued a “Statement on the
Aging Surgeon,” and in that statement “recommended that, starting at age 65 to
70, surgeons undergo voluntary and confidential baseline physical examination
and visual testing by their personal physician for overall health assessment.”412

406 Id. at 632.
407 Id.
408 Id.
409 John K. Iglehart & Robert B. Baron, Ensuring Physicians’ Competence—Is

Maintenance of Certification the Answer?, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2543, 2543 (2012);
Associated Press, Aging MDs Prompt Call for Competency Tests at AMA Meeting, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (June 8, 2015), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150608/
NEWS/306089975/aging-mds-prompt-call-for-competency-tests-at-ama-meeting [https://
perma.cc/B5B7-DCWC].
410 Skowronski & Peisah, supra note 402, at 505, 507 n.5.
411 AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMERGENCY
PHYSICIANS IN PRE-RETIREMENT YEARS (June 2015), https://www.acep.org/globalassets/
new-pdfs/policy-statements/considerations-for-emergency-physicians-in-pre-retirement
-years.pdf [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
412 Press Release, Am. Coll. of Surgeons, Statement on the Aging Surgeon (Jan. 1,
2016), https://www.facs.org/about-acs/statements/80-aging-surgeon [https://perma.cc
/NZ6T-NA3E].
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Some hospital systems have even implemented such testing for the
physicians within their system.413 In 2012, Stanford University Medical Center
rolled out a “compulsory . . . physical examination [every two years], cognitive
screening and peer assessment of clinical performance for all physicians aged
75 years.”414 The inclusion of the peer assessment component in the
examination is significant for the cultural and professional precedents it was
based on; peer assessments have been common in medicine since the second
half of the twentieth century, with proven feasibility and efficacy.415 As
physicians’ and surgeons’ colleagues are those who understand the nature of
their work best, their opinions on the quality of other doctors’ work, while
subjective, is an important factor to include in a cognitive assessment. Similarly,
the University of Virginia has “intermittent assessments of doctors after 70 years
of age.”416 Beginning in 2014, the Sinai Hospital of Baltimore introduced a
program to more closely align cognitive evaluations with a discussion on
retirement; this plan, known as the “Aging Surgeon Program,” is a “2-day
confidential evaluation of physical and cognitive function for surgeons” which
can be administered to surgeons other than Sinai Hospital employees, as well.417
Performing poorly on the program’s evaluations does not lead to mandatory
retirement, however; it leads to a discussion between the surgeon and their
hospital, “at which stage the decision to retire would still be with the surgeon,
unless there has been gross negligence.”418
It remains to be seen how the regulation of older physicians will develop,
but the trend is clear: many physicians and the institutions they serve recognize
that relying upon individual doctors—even with the nudging of their colleagues
and friends—may not be sufficient. The same can also be said for aging judges.

B. Judicial Functional Capacity—What’s Required?
What cognitive abilities are required to discharge efficiently all the duties
of a judicial office? The answer to this question requires a sustained
conversation amongst legal stakeholders and experts in science and medicine.

413 John Sanford, New Policy to Require Evaluations for Late-Career Practitioners,
STAN. MED. NEWS CTR. (July 16, 2012), http://med.stanford.edu/news/all-news/2012/
07/new-policy-to-require-evaluations-for-late-career-practitioners.html [https://perma
.cc/49TQ-KWKZ] (“[P]hysicians age 75 or older who practice at Stanford Hospital &
Clinics or Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital will be required to undergo a series of
evaluations to confirm that they are able to continue performing their clinical responsibilities
effectively.”).
414 Bhatt et al., supra note 401, at 40.
415 Ronald G. McAuley et al., Five-Year Results of the Peer Assessment Program of the
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 143 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1193, 1193 (1990)
(demonstrating “the need, feasibility and acceptance” of peer assessment).
416 Bhatt et al., supra note 401, at 40.
417 Id.
418 Id.
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Such a working group would need to acknowledge at the outset that this is a
difficult problem.
As Charles Geyh has observed from his historical treatment of the topic:
What to do with an allegedly senile, mentally ill, or otherwise disabled judge
is an understandably difficult issue that requires . . . [us] to balance the
conflicting interests of protecting the judicial system from the disabled judge,
insulating the nondisabled judge from politically motivated efforts at
neutralization, and preserving the dignity of the now-disabled judge who may
have served the judiciary long and well.419

At the heart of the challenge is the translation of a medical diagnosis to a
legal function. Other areas of policymaking around dementia illustrate how
difficult this translation can be. For instance, should a diagnosis of early-onset
Alzheimer’s result in immediate revocation of one’s driver’s license?420
We know that a disability in and of itself is not disqualifying. There are, for
instance, judges who are legally blind. In 2014, blind Judge Richard Bernstein
joined the Michigan Supreme Court.421 Judge David Tatel, on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, is also blind.422 Just as blind justices can,
with accommodations, execute their duties faithfully, we need to think carefully
about how judges exhibiting cognitive decline might still be able to serve on the
bench.
To develop an effective tool for assessing capacity in the judicial brain, we
need to first wrestle with the question: Capacity to do what? It is not enough to
say that the system cares about something vague such as “how well the judge’s
brain processes information.” This is because on one hand, older judicial brains
may process some information less well due to age-related cognitive decline (a
loss in fluid intelligence).423 But on the other hand, older judicial brains may
process some information better due to accumulated legal wisdom (a gain in
crystallized intelligence).424
Second, the toolbox should allow stakeholders to be proactive and not
simply reactive. Both the formal and informal mechanisms currently in use rely
upon the development of symptoms so significant that others in the courthouse
419 Geyh, supra note 164, at 271–72.
420 When I ask my students this in my law and neuroscience course, the class is almost

always split in their response. For a challenging case, see generally R. C. Hamdy, Driving
and Patients with Dementia, 4 GERONTOLOGY & GERIATRIC MED. 1 (2018).
421 Blind Judge Makes History, Joins Michigan’s Supreme Court, HUFFPOST (Dec. 28,
2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/blind-judge-michigan_n_6386856 [https://perma
.cc/48MG-BXQF].
422 Barbara Slavin, A Judge of Character: Although He’s Blind, David Tatel Skis, Runs
and Climbs Mountains. By Summer’s End, He May Be a Top Jurist Too., L.A. TIMES (July
28, 1994), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-07-28-ls-21024-story.html
[https://perma.cc/PDA7-S7TP].
423 See supra text accompanying notes 85–92.
424 Id.
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notice them.425 The use of sensitive neuropsychological tests and brain
biomarkers offers the system an opportunity to identify risks in advance.426
Third, a corollary of an emphasis on prevention is that implementation of
the system must ensure privacy and dignity for all judges. One way to
accomplish this is to move away from an all-or-nothing (retire or not) approach,
in which a judge’s duties can be aligned with their cognitive abilities. For
instance, a judge might continue to be an excellent resource for certain types of
cases, but no longer effective as a trial judge.
With those guiding principles established, we can turn to the specific health
information and cognitive functions to test. A useful place to start is to ask: What
health information is already requested from judges, at the nomination stage?
In the federal system, the form provided to judicial nominees begins with
the introductory text: “The physical and mental requirements for Judiciary
appointments are in principle that the appointee is currently capable, and for the
foreseeable future will be capable of efficient service without evidence of
mental or emotional instability.”427
The form later asks the nominee about “progressive neurological disorders,”
“current emotional or mental instability,” and “any other condition that is
disabling or potentially disabling in the foreseeable future.”428 Later in the form,
the medical provider is instructed to check either “Yes” or “No” in answer to
the question: “Do you find any abnormal condition or disease of . . . [the] brain
& nervous system?”429 This information is important at the nomination stage
because it is reasonable to assume that legislators would be hesitant about
nominating a judge whose cognitive machinery is potentially faulty. If this
information is relevant at the start of a judge’s career, surely it remains relevant
later.
At the state level, judicial nominee questionnaires suggest that health
information is of paramount importance. Of the twenty-five states who had
judicial nominee questionnaires available online, eighty percent required some
form of health or capacity information.430 Most states ask a version of this
question: “Are you physically and mentally able to perform the essential duties
of a judge in the court for which you are applying?”431 Some states, such as
Delaware, ask more probing questions. Delaware’s text reads:

425 See supra Part III (exploring the formal and informal mechanisms by which the
federal system identifies and responds to judges experiencing cognitive decline).
426 See supra note 13.
427 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9.
428 Id.
429 Id.
430 Memorandum from Sydney Diekmann to Shen Neurolaw Lab on Judge Nomination
Committee Health-Related Questions (Nov. 13, 2018) (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
431 This is the formulation as used in Arizona. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, ARIZ.,
APPLICATION FOR SELECTION TO SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE, https://bc.azgovernor.gov/
file/2104/download?token=PdqxhWg_ [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
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Ability to perform the essential functions of a judge means:
(i) The ability to analyze legal issues to reach reasoned legal judgments;
(ii) The ability to evaluate the credibility of witnesses;
(iii) The ability to make factual determinations from competing
presentations;
(iv) The ability to make decisions in a timely fashion;
(v) The ability to serve in a fair, impartial, and unbiased manner;
(vi) The ability to communicate orally and in writing, in an articulate and
logical manner;
(vii) The ability to demonstrate honesty, integrity, patience, openmindedness, courtesy, tact, compassion, and humility in performing
judicial functions;
(viii) The ability to exercise control over court proceedings; and
(ix) The ability to perform the above functions for a minimum of eight
hours per day, five days per week (or such other times as Court may
be in session), on a consistent basis . . . .
. . . Do you currently possess the physical and mental ability to perform
the essential functions of a judge, with or without a reasonable
accommodation? . . .
. . . Are you currently using illegal drugs, or do you habitually use illegal
drugs on a recreational basis or otherwise? . . .
. . . Do you frequently fail to take any lawful medications which enable
you to perform the essential functions of a judge? . . .
. . . Do you typically consume alcoholic beverages to such an extent that
your ability to perform the essential functions of a judge is impaired? . . .
. . . Are you a compulsive gambler, or have you ever been diagnosed or
received treatment, therapy, or counseling for compulsive gambling? 432

Just as the Delaware questions are grounded in the essential functions of the
judiciary, so too should the proposed cognitive testing system align with judicial
function.
One way to identify the core judicial functions is to examine the
jurisdiction’s judicial code of conduct.433 Codes of conduct form the basis of
our expectations for ethical and effective judicial behavior.434 The ABA

432 DEL. COURTS, QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NOMINEES FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE, https://courts
.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=32018 [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
433 In this Section, I make reference only to the federal Code of Conduct for United
States Judges, but state codes of judicial conduct are roughly equivalent for purposes of the
points I am making. See SHEN, APPENDIX, supra note 57.
434 See Cynthia Gray, Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety: With Great Power
Comes Great Responsibility, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 63, 64 (2005) (“To hold
judges to the highest standards of ethical conduct, a code of judicial conduct must cover not
just the clear and obvious improprieties but indirect, disguised, or careless conduct that looks
like an impropriety to an observer who is informed and thoughtful . . . .”).
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produced a canon of ethics in 1924,435 and, in the federal system, relevant canons
from the Code of Conduct for United States Judges include:






Canon 1: “A judge should maintain and enforce high standards of
conduct and should personally observe those standards, so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.”436
Canon 2: “A judge should respect and comply with the law and should
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. . . . A judge should not allow
family, social, political, financial, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment.”437
Canon 3(A)(1): “A judge should be faithful to, and maintain
professional competence in, the law and should not be swayed by
partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.”438
Canon 3(A)(3): “A judge should be patient, dignified, respectful, and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity.”439

In sum, these codes and our own intuition tell us that a judge must think and
feel with great integrity, competence, and sensitivity. These abilities—to think,
to feel, and to interact socially with others—are all a part of what the mind
sciences refer to as “cognition.”440
How a judge interprets these canons, of course, is open to much flexibility.
Temperament varies. Some judges are quieter, some louder, some harsher, some
more lenient. These and many other variations in judicial temperament are
typically deemed acceptable. For instance, as Terry Maroney has argued, we are
often split as to whether we want “angry judges” on the bench.441 While the
legal community is willing to accept variation in judicial personality,442 there
are limits to acceptable variation in cognitive ability. The toolbox then must be
flexible enough to allow for acceptable variation in temperament and intellect.
In developing the toolbox, the following non-exhaustive list of
considerations are of import:

435 CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1924).
436 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 1 (JUD. CONF. U.S. 2019) (emphasis

added).
437 Id. at Canon 2 (emphasis added).
438 Id. at Canon 3(A)(1) (emphasis added).
439 Id. at Canon 3(A)(3) (emphasis added).
440 See generally MICHAEL GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE

BIOLOGY OF THE MIND (3rd ed. 2008).
441 See Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1208–09 (2012)
(introducing “[l]aw’s split attitude on judicial anger”).
442 See generally Maxine Goodman, Three Likely Causes of Judicial Misbehavior and
How These Causes Should Inform Judicial Discipline, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 949 (2013)
(providing several illustrations of “judicial misbehavior” across courts).
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What areas of cognition should be the focus of the exam? Existing tools
are well equipped to be adapted to the legal context, and to explore
several relevant cognitive areas, including the following:
o Executive functioning: Judges need to use their executive function
capabilities extensively, and assessment of executive function must
thus be a central component of the toolbox.443
o Memory: Judges need to remember significant amounts of
information and need to be able to access that information regularly.
o Emotional Regulation: Judges need to engage with litigants and
courtroom staff in a professional, respectful manner. To the extent
that aging affects this ability, emotional capacity should be
explored.
How will we know if a judge has sufficient capacity on selected
cognitive dimensions? Even if we were to agree on the areas of
cognition, the system would need to develop thresholds to determine
judicial capacity. For instance, does a slight decrease in working
memory speed mean that the chief judge must be alerted?444 These linedrawing questions will no doubt be thorny. But it is not impossible to
arrive at a reasonable, widely accepted solution. As discussed above,
health care systems are already solving this problem in the context of
aging physicians.445
What is the menu of options available for declining judges? Much of
the literature on judicial retirement has framed the discussion as
offering a dichotomy: serve on the bench or retire.446 However, there
are a range of services that judges can provide, and the cognitive skill
sets required for these services vary across these judges. The system
should consider, as is being done in the physician context, how skill sets
(even if in decline) can be matched to meaningful work.
Who will administer the system?
o While the Judicial Conference seems a natural home for the
administration of this testing regime,447 it would have to coordinate
with regional health care providers to implement the assessments.
o To what extent will other agencies be involved in the funding and/or
administration of the system?
o Questions of regulatory oversight, agency independence, appeals
processes, and the like would need to be considered.
How can the system ensure privacy and dignity for judges?

443 See supra text accompanying note 95.
444 See supra text accompanying note 96.
445 See supra Part VI.A.2.
446 Compare, e.g., Hemel, supra note 5, with Segall, supra note 5.
447 This is because the Judicial Conference is the “national policy-making body for the

federal courts.” Governance and the Judicial Conference, U.S. CTS., http://www.us
courts.gov/about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference [https://perma.cc/9QED
-ARPA].
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Mandatory assessment of judges introduces many questions of
information privacy and compliance with relevant privacy laws.
o In addition, a dignified pathway to retirement must be ensured. For
instance, judges could be phased out in ways that would allow them
to keep their health record private.
Which stakeholders should play a role in the design of this system?
Stakeholders whose voices should be heard include:
o Judges and their families, in both state and federal judiciary systems
o Judicial Council and state equivalents
o Litigants
o Professional associations, e.g., American Bar Association
o Citizens
How often should the assessment be administered? There are a variety
of options for the timing of the assessment, and discussion can draw on
relevant medical research related to optimal screening intervals by age.

These design features would, of course, need to be further worked out.
Likewise, funding for the program would need to be obtained. But because at
least some of the costs would be covered by the existing health care plan, cost
should not be a major stumbling block. Once developed, the system would
consist of the following components:







Specific examination protocols for the initial baseline assessment
during the nomination process, with clearly established processes for
communicating incidental findings and possible identification of
neuropathology to the candidate;
Specific examination protocols for follow-up visits (which may vary by
age and availability of experts);
Specific protocols for maintaining privacy of health data;
Educational programs, similar to the wellness committees, in each
jurisdiction to explain the nature and importance of the brain health
assessment; and
System-wide administration to ensure communication and compliance
with the cognitive health assessment requirement.

These components can be compiled into a uniform judicial cognitive health
assessment program that (1) collects baseline neuroimaging and
neuropsychology data at the nomination stage, and follow-up neuroimaging and
neuropsychology data in regular five-year intervals thereafter; and (2) requires
that the results of the testing remain private, with no exceptions unless expressly
authorized by the judge evaluated.
Designed this way, the system is more about judicial empowerment than it
is about judicial reprimand. It mandates the testing, but also mandates the
privacy of that testing data. The requirements to operate the system are
attainable: access to experts in relevant fields, and a central administrative office
to ensure that judges do follow-up testing at the appropriate times and with the

2020]

AGING JUDGES

297

appropriate specialists. The toolbox could be readily added to both the federal
and state systems.

C. Existing Assessment Tools
It is premature to select the specific tools that would be used for judicial
cognitive assessment, but I review a number of potential options in this Section.
Cognitive testing and screening for dementia are conducted regularly in a
variety of contexts.448 To facilitate this screening, there are a number of
cognitive tests for older adults.449 A public health challenge is implementing the
proper screening tools, and these challenges might similarly arise in the judicial
screening context. For the public, a fear of stigmatization, a lack of awareness
of dementia, and a lack of resources (such as cost and time) hinder the
widespread acceptance of population screening for dementia.450 Another
hindrance to screening is the lack of a standardized assessment tool to assess
cognitive functioning and impairment, or the inaccuracy of currently available
screening tools.451
Currently, practice guidelines published by the American Academy of
Neurology (AAN) in 2001 recommend that cognitive impairment be assessed
using screening instruments and neuropsychology testing batteries, and that
such assessments may be supplemented with specific cognitive instruments that
“focus on limited aspects of cognitive function” (such as executive function)
and informant interviews with individuals close to the patient.452 While the
AAN mentions specific tools that may be used for screening purposes, such as
448 See Henry Brodaty et al., What Is the Best Dementia Screening Instrument for
General Practitioners to Use?, 14 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 391, 391 (2006) (“The
detection and early diagnosis of dementia are becoming increasingly important as our
population ages. . . . Early diagnosis may enable patients to plan for the future while still
competent, initiate enduring power of attorney and guardianship, address safety concerns
such as driving ability, and enable caregivers to seek education sooner.”); Jennifer R. Harvan
& Valerie T. Cotter, An Evaluation of Dementia Screening in the Primary Care Setting, 18
J. AM. ACAD. NURSE PRACTITIONERS 351, 351–52 (2006) (describing the need for routine
screening for dementia in elderly populations).
449 See generally Stelios Zygouris & Magda Tsolaki, Computerized Cognitive Testing
for Older Adults: A Review, 30 AM. J. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE & OTHER DEMENTIAS 13 (2015)
(analyzing the merits and weaknesses of the different cognitive assessments for elderly
populations).
450 See Steven Martin et al., Attitudes and Preferences Towards Screening for Dementia:
A Systematic Review of the Literature, 15 BMC GERIATRICS 1, 10 (2015) (“Attitudes and
preferences [toward wide-spread dementia screening] are complex and multi-factorial and
our findings suggest that population screening for dementia may be acceptable neither to the
general public nor to health care professionals.”).
451 Id. at 8.
452 R.C. Petersen et al., Practice Parameter: Early Detection of Dementia: Mild
Cognitive Impairment (an Evidence-Based Review): Report of the Quality Standards
Subcommittee of the American Academy of Neurology, 56 NEUROLOGY 1133, 1139–40
(2001).
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the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE),453 a multitude of screening tools
are being used and developed.
After its initial development and introduction in 1975, the MMSE has
become one of the most frequently used cognitive tests for assessing cognitive
impairment across the world.454 The instrument has been translated and
empirically validated for use in many different languages and countries,455 and
certain versions have even been made available for those with disabilities,
including impaired vision.456 The MMSE consists of “19 individual tests of 11
domains covering orientation, registration, attention or calculation (serial sevens
or spelling), recall, naming, repetition, comprehension (verbal and written),
writing, and construction.”457 The MMSE has historically been used to detect
whether or not patients have dementia, although in recent years, the test has been
applied to identify patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) as well.458
Many attempts have been made to empirically validate the diagnostic
sensitivity (the ability of the instrument to diagnose those with dementia as
having dementia) and specificity (the ability of the instrument to diagnose those
without dementia as not having dementia) of the MMSE.459
One reason why the MMSE may be so widely used is because the score
results are relatively easy for healthcare professionals to interpret.460 The
MMSE is championed as the user-friendly test for patients, administrators, and
evaluators.461 Cut-off scores (or “thresholds”) exist that denote boundaries
between “normal” cognition and impaired cognition.462 The MMSE is
453 Id. at 1138.
454 See Alex J. Mitchell, A Meta-Analysis of the Accuracy of the Mini-Mental State

Examination in the Detection of Dementia and Mild Cognitive Impairment, 43 J.
PSYCHIATRIC RES. 411, 411 (2009) (“Since [1975 the MMSE] has become widely used and
highly cited.”).
455 See J. Olazarán Rodríguez & F. Bermejo Pareja, There Is No Scientific Basis for
Retiring the MMSE, 30 NEUROLOGÍA 589, 590 (2015) (noting that the MMSE’s availability
in “so many languages and countries” is a reason for its widespread popularity).
456 See generally Anja Busse et al., Adaptation of Dementia Screening for VisionImpaired Older Persons: Administration of the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE), 55
J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 909 (2002) (analyzing the adaption of the MMSE to visually
impaired individuals).
457 Mitchell, supra note 454, at 411.
458 Id. at 412.
459 See generally Alex J. Mitchell et al., The Mini-Mental State Examination as a
Diagnostic and Screening Test for Delirium: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 36 GEN.
HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 627 (2014) (compiling MMSE sensitivity and specificity data).
460 Mitchell, supra note 454, at 412 (describing MMSE scores as “fairly well understood
by health professionals”).
461 See C. Carnero-Pardo, Should the Mini-Mental State Examination Be Retired?, 29
NEUROLOGÍA 473, 475 (2014) (touting the MMSE as a “user-friendly instrument that can be
administered and evaluated by non-qualified personnel”).
462 Generally, the most accepted cut-off score is around 24. See Patrizio Pezotti et al.,
The Accuracy of the MMSE in Detecting Cognitive Impairment when Administered by
General Practitioners: A Prospective Observational Study, 9 BMC FAM. PRAC. 1, 3 (2008)
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deceptively simple, however, because the cut-off thresholds are not necessarily
clinically significant.463 These and other limitations have resulted in some
experts calling for the retirement of the MMSE in place of more freely available
and effective screening tools,464 while other experts argue that it would be more
efficient to improve the existing scale.465 Support for the use of the MMSE as
the sole diagnostic criterion is weak.466 In the context of judicial cognitive
screening, it would be a mistake to simplify a judge’s entire mental capacity into
a single number or even a single test.
Developed after the MMSE, the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA)
is a ten-minute cognitive test that consists of eleven tasks designed to address
the major efficacy limitations of the MMSE.467 Completion of these tasks
awards the participants points, which are aggregated to produce a score on a
thirty-point scale.468 A score of at least twenty-six points indicates normal
cognitive functioning; likewise, a score below twenty-six points indicates some
degree of cognitive impairment, with lower scores indicating more severe
impairment.469
While the MoCA takes slightly longer to administer than the MMSE, the
MoCA covers more cognitive domains, including additional items that measure
executive and visuospatial function.470 As such, the MoCA can identify changes
that are typically not identified by the MMSE.471 For example, the MoCA is
significantly better at distinguishing MCI from normal age-related decline.472
(“The total score for the MMSE ranges from 0 to 30; scores > 24 indicate basically no
cognitive impairment; scores < 18 indicate severe cognitive impairment.”); Kelvin K. F. Tsoi
et al., Cognitive Tests to Detect Dementia: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 175
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1450, 1456–57 (2015) (“[T]he most common cutoff scores for the
MMSE for dementia were 23 and 24 . . . .”).
463 See Tsoi et al., supra note 462, at 1456–57 (noting “considerable variation on the
definitions of cutoff thresholds” among the MMSE and other cognitive exams).
464 See, e.g., id. at 1457 (“Although the MMSE is a proprietary instrument for dementia
screening, the other screening tests are comparably effective but easier to perform and freely
available.”).
465 See Rodríguez & Pareja, supra note 455, at 590 (advocating for changes to the
existing MMSE in lieu of its retirement).
466 Id.
467 See Ziad S. Nasreddine et al., The Montreal Cognitive Assessment, MoCA: A Brief
Screening Tool for Mild Cognitive Impairment, 53 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 695, 697 (2005)
(detailing the items involved in the MoCA); David R. Roalf et al., Bridging Cognitive
Screening Tests in Neurologic Disorders: A Crosswalk Between the Short Montreal
Cognitive Assessment and Mini-Mental State Examination, 13 ALZHEIMER’S &
DEMENTIA 947, 948 (2017) (“The MoCA overcomes some, but not all, of the limitations of
the MMSE . . . .”).
468 Nasreddine et al., supra note 467, at 697.
469 See id. at 698 (describing the cut-off score of twenty-six for the MoCA as yielding
the best balance between sensitivity and specificity).
470 Roalf et al., supra note 467, at 948.
471 See id. at 948.
472 Id.
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Moreover, MoCA and MMSE scores are highly correlated, which allows the
conversion of one score into the other to allow for direct comparison of
cognitive performance through different screening tools.473 The usefulness of
each tool relative to each other depends on the nature of the brain disturbance.474
The MMSE and MoCA are not the only dementia screening tools
available.475 A systematic review and meta-analysis of 149 studies that covered
eleven different screening tests, including the MMSE and MoCA, found that
many other tools, including the Mini-Cog test and the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive
Examination-Revised, exhibit similar (sometimes better) rates of diagnostic
accuracy for dementia than the MMSE.476 Furthermore, using multiple
screening methods instead of just one is likely to significantly improve
diagnostic accuracy.477 As such, researchers have been attempting to determine
if certain combinations of assessment tools yield higher sensitivity and
specificity.478
The legal system is not unfamiliar with utilizing a battery of
neuropsychological tests, as a number of different tests are being used together
to determine cognitive faculties in former NFL players under the terms of the
NFL Concussion Settlement.479
473 Id. at 949.
474 See Arun Aggarwal & Emma Kean, Comparison of the Folstein Mini Mental State

Examination (MMSE) to the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) as a Cognitive
Screening Tool in an Inpatient Rehabilitation Setting, 1 NEUROSCIENCE & MED. 39, 41
(2010) (“[Compared to the MoCA,] the MMSE does not perform well as a screening
instrument for [MCI] . . . .”); YanHong Dong et al., The Montreal Cognitive Assessment
(MoCA) Is Superior to the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) for the Detection of
Vascular Cognitive Impairment After Acute Stroke, 299 J. NEUROLOGICAL SCI. 15, 17 (2010)
(discussing the “poorer performance of the MMSE at detecting [vascular cognitive
impairment]”); Alex J. Mitchell & Srinivasa Malladi, Screening and Case Finding Tools for
the Detection of Dementia. Part I: Evidence-Based Meta-Analysis of Multidomain Tests, 18
AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 759, 760 (2010) (“[T]he MMSE seems to be a reasonably
accurate method of detecting dementia . . . .”); Emad Salib & Justin McCarthy, Mental
Alternation Test (MAT): A Rapid and Valid Screening Tool for Dementia in Primary
Care, 17 INT’L J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 1157, 1160 (2002) (noting the difficulties in
administrating the MMSE to visually impaired, deaf, or otherwise physically disabled
individuals).
475 See Carnero-Pardo, supra note 461, at 477–78 (listing the basic characteristics of
other “short cognitive tests” in addition to the MMSE and MoCA). For example, other short
cognitive tests include the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination (ACE), the Memory
Impairment Screen (MIS), and the Seven Minute Screen (7MT). Id. at 478.
476 See Tsoi et al., supra note 462, at 1452, 1455 (finding similar or better specificity
and sensitivity for both the ACE-R and Mini-Cog over the MMSE).
477 See Nasreddine et al., supra note 467, at 698 (suggesting a patient to first undergo
the MoCA if they complain of cognitive impairment but show no functional impairment).
478 See, e.g., Harvan & Cotter, supra note 448, at 355 (noting higher sensitivities and
specificities when the MMSE is combined with the Clock Drawing Test). Such attempts
have produced mixed results.
479 See Amended Class Action Settlement Agreement, Exhibit A-2, In re Nat’l Football
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 14-cv-0029 (E.D. Penn. Feb. 13, 2015)
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Additional tests that may be of potential use for judicial assessment include
the following:480






Test of Premorbid Functioning (TOPF): The TOPF is a brief test
estimating premorbid (i.e., before symptoms from the disease or
disorder arise) cognitive and memory function.481 Participants are asked
to pronounce phonetically irregular words, a process generally resistant
to neurological decline.482
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale IV (WAIS IV): The WAIS IV
measures overall intellectual ability, assessing cognitive performance
across four domains: verbal comprehension (verbal reasoning and
communication); perceptual reasoning (fluid reasoning and perceptual
organization); working memory (attention, concentration, and working
memory), and processing speed (mental processing and efficient use of
other cognitive abilities).483 Each domain is assessed using multiple
subtests that measure additional processes, such as crystallized
intelligence and cognitive flexibility.484
Wechsler Memory Scale IV (WMS IV): The WMS IV measures
memory function using subtests assessing auditory memory, visual
memory, and visual working memory.485 Each of these components of
memory are assessed in immediate and delayed conditions.486

(setting forth the “Baseline Neuropsychological Test Battery” to which each qualified former
NFL player is entitled).
480 This list is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. Additional tests to rule out
response bias or poor effort might include the California Verbal Learning Test or the Validity
Indicator Profile. See Sun et al., supra note 106.
481 PEARSON, TEST OF PREMORBID FUNCTIONING (TOPF) (2009), https://www.pearson
clinical.com.au/products/view/596 [https://perma.cc/57BU-5DZC].
482 James A. Holdnack et al., Predicting Premorbid Ability for WAIS–IV, WMS–IV and
WASI–II, in WAIS-IV, WMS-IV, AND ACS: ADVANCED CLINICAL INTERPRETATION 217, 226
(James A. Holdnack et al. eds., 2013). Performance on the reading task can be combined
with various demographic factors (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, education, developmental
factors) to estimate premorbid intellectual function. Lisa Whipple Drozdick et al., Overview
of the WAIS–IV/WMS–IV/ACS, in WAIS-IV, WMS-IV, AND ACS: ADVANCED CLINICAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 482, at 1, 55. Using the TOPF scores, clinicians can estimate
expected performance on the WAIS IV and WMS IV to determine if the participant has
experienced a decline. Id.
483 Drozdick et al., supra note 482, at 2.
484 Diane L. Coalson et al., WAIS-IV: Advances in the Assessment of Intelligence, in
WAIS-IV CLINICAL USE AND INTERPRETATION 3, 7–8 (Lawrence G. Weiss et al. eds., 2010).
For example, a subtest assessing working memory asks participants to recall a list of
numbers, and a subtest assessing verbal comprehension provides participants with two
concepts and asks them to describe how they are similar. Id. at 8.
485 James A. Holdnack & Lisa W. Drozdick, Using WAIS-IV with WMS-IV, in WAISIV CLINICAL USE AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 484, at 237, 238.
486 Drozdick et al., supra note 482, at 20. This means that participants are presented with
information or stimuli that they must reproduce immediately and then after a delay. Id. at 11.
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Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS): The D-KEFS
measures executive functioning: the cognitive processes required to
mentally assess ideas, resist temptations, and remain focused.487 The DKEFS subtests are standalone measures tapping into various facets of
executive functioning, such as self-control, working memory, and
cognitive flexibility.488
o The Trail Making Test measures flexibility of thinking. Participants
must draw a trail through letters and numbers.489
o The Verbal Fluency Test measures fluency by asking participants
to generate lists of words based on characteristics such as first letter
(“F”) or category (“animals”).490
o The Design Fluency Test measures problem-solving behavior,
nonverbal productive and creativity, rule following, and visualperceptual speed.491 Participants draw novel patterns while abiding
by specific rules.492
o The Color-Word Interference Test measures inhibition.493
Participants report the color of color words (e.g., “green”) written
in another color (e.g., red ink).494
o The Tower Test measures spatial planning, rule learning, and
inhibition.495 Participants must, in the fewest possible moves,
manipulate variably sized discs across pegs to an end spot
designated by the examiner.496
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task: The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task is a
measure of cognitive flexibility, a component of executive function.497

487 Adele Diamond, Executive Functions, 64 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 135, 155 (2013).
488 Id. at 136.
489 Christopher R. Bowie & Philip D. Harvey, Administration and Interpretation of the

Trail Making Test, 1 NATURE PROTOCOLS 2277, 2277 (2006).
490 See Susan Homack et al., Test Review: Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System, 27
J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 599, 599–600 (2005).
491 See John L. Woodard et al., Interrater Reliability of Scoring Parameters for the
Design Fluency Test, 6 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 173, 173–74 (1992).
492 Id.
493 Arthur R. Jensen & William D. Rowher, Jr., The Stroop Color-Word Test: A
Review, 25 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 36, 36–38 (1966).
494 Diamond, supra note 487, at 139.
495 In this context, the “Tower Test” refers to the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function
System (D-KEFS), a test of executive functioning. See Anne-Claire Larochette et al.,
Executive Functioning: A Comparison of the Tower of London DX and the D-KEFS Tower
Test, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 275, 275–76 (2009) (“[Executive functioning]
includes five general domains of functioning: fluency, planning, working memory,
inhibition, and set shifting . . . . One of the most widely used tests of [executive functioning]
is the Tower of London . . . . Recently, a new battery of tests called the [D-KEFS] was
introduced, which included a new version of the tower test.” (citations omitted)).
496 Id. at 276.
497 See Diamond, supra note 487, at 149 (“Cognitive flexibility is often investigated
using any of a wide array of task-switching and set-shifting tasks. The oldest of these is
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Participants must deduce the correct sorting criteria for a deck of cards
based solely on feedback of correct or incorrect from the examiner,
switching their rules when the examiner indicates the criteria has
changed.498
Booklet Category Test: The Booklet Category Test measures concept
formation and abstraction.499 Participants must match various stimuli,
such as letters, numbers or shapes, to possible responses during seven
subtests.500 Participants are only provided with feedback of correct and
incorrect.501 During each subtest, the rule is different, and participants
must abstract each of the seven rules or concepts.502
California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT): The CVLT assesses verbal
learning and memory.503 The examiner reads a list of nouns aloud, and
participants must recall them immediately and then after a delay.504
There is also an additional recognition phase available, which can be
used as a test of the participant’s effort.505
Validity Indicator Profile: The Validity Indicator Profile was
designed to detect malingered cognitive impairment.506 Participants
must select one of two choices, with difficulty increasing throughout
the test.507 Participants providing good effort would demonstrate
decreasing performance over the test, while those providing variable

probably the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, one of the classic tests of prefrontal cortex
function.” (citations omitted)).
498 Id.
499 Stanley R. Steindl & Gregory J. Boyle, Use of the Booklet Category Test to Assess
Abstract Concept Formation in Schizophrenic Disorders, 10 CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY
205, 206 (1995) (citing Nick A. DeFilippis et al., Brief Report Development of a Booklet
Form of the Category Test: Normative and Validity Data, 1 J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 339 (1979)).
500 DeFilippis et al., supra note 499, at 399.
501 Id. at 340.
502 Id.
503 See Richard W. Elwood, The California Verbal Learning Test: Psychometric
Characteristics and Clinical Application, 5 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY REV. 173, 173 (1995)
(“[This review] concludes that if the limitations of the CVLT are recognized, it can still make
a useful contribution to the clinical assessment of verbal learning and memory.”).
504 Id. at 174.
505 See James C. Root et al., Detection of Inadequate Effort on the California Verbal
Learning Test-Second Edition: Forced Choice Recognition and Critical Item Analysis, 12 J.
INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 688, 695 (2006) (“[Two measurement] indices,
developed within the CVLT-II as brief screens of effort, exhibit strong predictive value in
positive findings of inadequate effort.”).
506 Richard I. Frederick & Ross D. Crosby, Development and Validation of the Validity
Indicator Profile, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 59, 61 (2000).
507 Id.
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effort or malingering would not demonstrate a pattern of decreasing
performance.508
The bottom line for judicial screening is that no single tool will provide
accurate assessment of judicial capacity, but also that the development of a
judicial assessment tool should build on the extensive work in these areas.

D. Emerging Neuroscientific Technologies
The future of psychiatric medicine is increasingly moving toward the
integration of biomarkers in diagnosis and treatment.509 In the area of dementia,
new neuroimaging techniques are being developed to detect biomarkers for
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in its earliest stages.510 Such biomarkers can identify
atrophying neural tissue in people with AD before they manifest observable
behavioral changes.511 Because early detection is seen as so important, in 2004
the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI) was formed to
develop a range of biomarkers—including imaging, genetic, and biochemical—
for the early detection and monitoring of AD.512 Moreover, these developments

508 Id.
509 See Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience 2.0, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1043, 1063 (2016)

(“Psychiatrist Matthew Baum’s recent book on the neuroethics of biomarkers is an important
contribution to this dialogue. Baum points out that ‘biomarker discovery and assembly into
bio-actuarial tools are poised to proceed at an unprecedented pace.’”).
510 See STEVEN D. PEARSON ET AL., INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REVIEW, DIAGNOSTIC
TESTS FOR ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE: GENERATING AND EVALUATING EVIDENCE TO INFORM
INSURANCE COVERAGE POLICY 43 (2012) (“[P]rospective cohort studies (e.g., Alzheimer’s
Disease Neuroimaging Initiative) that have recruited convenience samples of patients are
ongoing to evaluate the performance of multiple biomarkers . . . .”); Fiandaca et al., supra
note 129, at 201 (“The capability of the neuroimaging modalities continues to improve, and
their role in defining the preclinical state of AD is evolving.”); Risacher & Saykin, supra
note 129, at 625 (describing neuroimaging as an “excellent noninvasive set of methods” for
measuring AD progression).
511 Risacher & Saykin, supra note 129, at 625–26 (“Sensitive and specific biomarkers
of AD are needed to detect patients in the early and preclinical stages of AD, to effectively
monitor and predict disease progression, and to provide differential diagnostic information
for an accurate diagnosis. . . . Neuroimaging [can] . . . measur[e] in vivo AD
pathophysiology and brain atrophy associated with MCI and AD, as well as for predicting
disease progression, even in patients with relatively minor or no cognitive impairments.”
(citations omitted)).
512 Susanne G. Mueller et al., Ways Toward an Early Diagnosis in Alzheimer’s Disease:
The Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI), 1 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 55,
55 (2005); Michael W. Weiner et al., The Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative: A
Review of Papers Published Since Its Inception, 8 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 1, 2 (2012).
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are no longer confined to research labs.513 In 2018, the Alzheimer’s Association
called for the redefinition of AD based on biomarkers.514
There are many legal and ethical questions that follow from the introduction
of biomarkers.515 At present, brain biomarkers are not routinely used to diagnose
psychiatric disorders.516 But some are optimistic about both present and nearfuture abilities.517 Psychiatrist Matthew Baum similarly observes that
“biomarker discovery and assembly into bio-actuarial tools are poised to
proceed at an unprecedented pace.”518
The implication of these trends for judicial screening is that the screening is
likely to include neuroimaging. The screening tool should harness the
potentially powerful information that brain data can provide but must also be
carefully crafted to guard against inappropriate uses.519 Particularly challenging
will be the cases where the neuroimaging diverges from the judge’s behavior.
As my lab has explored elsewhere: “Is a neurological indicator of increased risk
for [cognitive decline] a legally relevant brain state before there are outward
behavioral manifestations [of that decline?]”520

513 See Alzheimer’s Disease Redefined: New Research Framework Defines Alzheimer’s

by Brain Changes, Not Symptoms, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.alz
.org/news/2018/alzheimer_s_disease_redefined_new_reseearch_frame [https://perma
.cc/2L4J-N9JE] (summarizing a recent publication in its official research journal
advocating for a redefinition of AD based on biomarkers).
514 Id.
515 See Ilina Singh & Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong, Introduction: Deviance,
Classification, and Bioprediction, in BIOPREDICTION, BIOMARKERS, AND BAD BEHAVIOR 10,
11 (Ilina Singh et al. eds., 2013). (“Much scientific work remains to be done in the area of
predictive biomarkers, but this is not a reason to be complacent about its impact on and
translation into the public domain.”).
516 Steven E. Hyman, Can Neuroscience Be Integrated into the DSM-V?, NATURE REV.
NEUROSCIENCE 725, 725 (2007).
517 See Alex Fornito & Edward T. Bullmore, Does fMRI Have a Role in Personalized
Health Care for Psychiatric Patients?, in INTEGRATIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND PERSONALIZED
MEDICINE 55, 55 (Evian Gordon & Stephen H. Koslow eds., 2011) (“[R]ecent conceptual
and methodological advances provide a sufficient basis for cautious optimism concerning
the future clinical applicability of fMRI [a biomarker imaging technique] . . . in three key
clinical domains: clinical diagnosis, prediction of illness, and treatment monitoring.”).
518 Matthew L. Baum, The Neuroethics of Biomarkers: What the Development of
Bioprediction Means for Moral Responsibility, Justice, and the Nature of Mental Disorder,
in OXFORD SERIES IN NEUROSCIENCE, LAW, & PHILOSOPHY 1, 10–11 (Lynn Nadel et al. eds.,
2014).
519 For a discussion of possible inappropriate uses, see Owen D. Jones et al., Law and
Neuroscience, 33 J. NEUROSCIENCE 17,624, 17,628–29 (2014) (raising the ethical issues of
new techniques in neuroscience as they may be applied in legal settings).
520 Joshua Preston et al., The Legal Implications of Detecting Alzheimer’s Disease
Earlier, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 1207, 1208 (2016).
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E. The Neuroethics of Detecting Probabilistic Biomarkers in Judges
The legal implications of using biomarkers to detect Alzheimer’s and other
forms of dementia remain relatively unknown.521 It is therefore of paramount
importance to map out the ethical, legal, and social implications of collecting
brain data from judges. Most bodies of law—including tort, contracts, and
criminal law—have traditionally demanded outwardly manifested behavior as a
prerequisite for legal recognition of physical injury.522 The advent of AD
biomarkers thus poses a conundrum: How should the law treat a person who
does not exhibit behavioral symptoms but whose brain is documented to have
already changed in such a way as to suggest a higher likelihood of AD? In the
language of the National Institutes of Aging research framework, how will we
treat someone who is in the pre-symptomatic phase, wherein they are on the
Alzheimer’s continuum but still symptom free?523 The question might be
particularly difficult at the time of judicial confirmation.
While the full legal implications of AD biomarkers are under-explored in
the literature, what is clear is that they pose unique ethical issues for clinicians
and researchers. The current nondiscrimination legal landscape does not
accommodate individuals with these biomarkers.524
Historically, the disclosure of a patient’s AD diagnosis has posed a
pervasive ethical challenge for clinicians.525 The asymptomatic and nontreatable nature of AD biomarkers complicates this further, and clinicians need
to consider the benefits, risks, and limitations of disclosing amyloid
neuroimaging results to the judicial nominee (and to the judicial nominating
committee) when the nominee is otherwise cognitively normal.526 This will not
521 See id. at 1207 (noting that there is little research on the legal issues surrounding the
use of biomarkers as a detection method for AD).
522 See Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 2036,
2044 (2013) (“In a variety of criminal and quasi-criminal contexts, . . . legislative line
drawing between criminal and non-criminal behavior invokes the concept of ‘bodily’ (or
‘physical’) injury.”).
523 Clifford R. Jack, Jr. et al., Hypothetical Model of Dynamic Biomarkers of the
Alzheimer’s Pathological Cascade, 9 LANCET NEUROLOGY 119 (2010) (“The clinical disease
stages of AD have been divided into three phases. First is a pre-symptomatic phase in which
individuals are cognitively normal but some have AD pathological changes.”).
524 Jalayne J. Arias et al., The Proactive Patient: Long-Term Care Insurance
Discrimination Risks of Alzheimer’s Disease Biomarkers, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 485, 485
(2018).
525 See generally S. Gauthier et al., Diagnosis and Management of Alzheimer’s Disease:
Past, Present and Future Ethical Issues, 110 PROGRESS NEUROBIOLOGY 102 (2013).
526 J. Scott Roberts et al., Presentation on Assessing the Impact of Disclosing Amyloid
Imaging Results to Cognitively Normal Older Adults: The Reveal-Scan Study (July 19,
2017) (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (assessing ethical issues in revealing
Alzheimer’s disease biomarkers to asymptomatic adults); see also Howard M. Fillit, We
Need New Biomarkers for Alzheimer’s Disease, SCI. AM. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://blogs
.scientificamerican.com/observations/we-need-new-biomarkers-for-alzheimers-disease/
[https://perma.cc/9PQE-MZ6S] (stating that Alzheimer’s disease is currently untreatable).
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only require clinicians to prepare new counseling aids but also to reconsider the
risks subjects face in neuroimaging research and how they seek informed
consent.527 States and the federal government will also have to revisit the
medical disclosure waivers they require nominees to sign.528
Additional consideration needs to be placed on the impact this information
can have on judges and their family members.529 Despite the lack of treatment
options, stakeholders report the benefit of clinical management of the disease,
making lifestyle changes, and preparing for eventual cognitive impairment.530
Even so, studies report fears of social harm, such as stigmatization, adverse life
decisions, and psychological harm.531
Despite the presence of nondiscrimination laws like the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
(GINA), and others, these legal frameworks do not address asymptomatic health
information like AD biomarkers.532 One fifty-state survey of nondiscrimination
laws found that many emphasized “genetic information,” which by definition
amyloid and tau biomarkers are not.533 Another fifty-state survey found that
only half of all states have long-term care insurance regulations that prohibit
discrimination based on pre-existing conditions.534 Forty-three states do not
prohibit long-term care insurers from using health information in their
underwriting decisions, which makes these laws inadequate in “protect[ing]
individuals from discrimination based on biomarker status in the context of
[long-term care] insurance.”535 Such a “failure to address and mitigate
discrimination risks will prevent individuals who are biomarker positive from
accessing critical resources to prepare for financial burden of [long-term service
and support] costs.”536

527 See Roberts et al., supra note 526; see also Julio C. Rojas et al., Presentation on

Uncertainties and Ethical Considerations for Decision-Making Regarding Amyloid-Related
Imaging Abnormalities in Clinical Trials for Alzheimer’s Disease (July 19, 2017) (on file
with Ohio State Law Journal) (noting that in research involving amyloid-related imaging
abnormalities (ARIA), the likelihood of identifying biomarkers with probabilistic risk
requires informed consent that should “emphasize acknowledgment and communication of
the limitations of data availability”).
528 See, e.g., DEL. COURTS, supra note 432.
529 Jalayne J. Arias et al., Stakeholders’ Perspectives on Preclinical Testing for
Alzheimer’s Disease, 26 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 297, 301–02 (2015).
530 Id. at 300.
531 See id. at 301 (noting reported adverse life decisions and psychological harm from
testing); Jalayne J. Arias, Presentation on Distinguishing Legal Consequences in At-Risk
Testing for Alzheimer’s Disease: Genetics Versus Non-Genetic Biomarkers (July 19, 2017)
(on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (stating that stigma can result from disclosure of
biomarkers for Alzheimer’s).
532 Arias et al., supra note 524, at 485.
533 See Arias, supra note 531.
534 See Arias et al., supra note 524, at 495.
535 Id.
536 Id.
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If the legal system were to introduce a system in which judges were required
to obtain brain scans, it could place the judge in an ethical quandary: If she has
no symptoms, but the brain scan reveals the progression of neuropathology,
must she report it to the chief judge?537 To the insurance company?538 How will
return of results be developed?539
Moreover, careful attention must be paid to diseases other than AD. While
much of the literature focuses on AD,540 it is only one of many forms of
dementia, including dementia with Lewy bodies, vascular dementia, and
frontotemporal dementia.541 There are considerable—and under-explored—
implications of early AD detection for estate law, end-of-life care, and family
law.542 This Article has focused primarily on the implications of judicial brain
health for the legal system. But the judge must also be recognized as a patient.

VII. DISCUSSION
This Part discusses several possible implications of, and extensions to, the
system proposed in Part V. I discuss (A) constitutionality, (B) feasibility, and
(C) legitimacy.

537 See FAQs: Filing a Judicial Complaint or Disability Complaint Against a Federal

Judge, U.S. CTS. (June 2016), https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicialconduct-disability/faqs-filing-judicial-conduct-or-disability-complaint#faq-How-will-the
-circuit-chief-judge-consider-my-complaint? [https://perma.cc/WXC6-J5WR] (describing
review processes for judicial conduct by chief judge).
538 See generally David R. Cohen, Judicial Malpractice Insurance—The Judiciary
Responds to the Loss of Absolute Immunity?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 267 (1990)
(describing rise of malpractice insurance for the judiciary).
539 See generally Jalayne J. Arias & Jason Karlawish, Confidentiality in Preclinical
Alzheimer Disease Studies: When Research and Medical Records Meet, 82 NEUROLOGY 725
(2014) (describing the shortcomings in regulation and possible adverse consequences of the
loss of confidentiality for those with test results indicative of Alzheimer’s disease
pathology).
540 See Craig W. Ritchie et al., Dementia Trials and Dementia Tribulations:
Methodological and Analytical Challenges in Dementia Research, 7 ALZHEIMER’S RES. &
THERAPY 1, 2 (2015) (“The commonest cause of dementia in community dwelling older
adults is Alzheimer’s disease (AD). AD research has accordingly tended to dominate the
dementia landscape.”).
541 Other Dementias, ALZHEIMER SOC’Y CAN., https://alzheimer.ca/en/Home/Aboutdementia/Dementias?gclid=Cj0KCQiA04XxBRD5ARIsAGFygj8x06t70alM -Iotxaxca
gWsf_Oa97p8-y7wpXvpWFB67HZchHcqdzQaAp28EALw_wcB [https://perma.cc/C5
4L-YBDD] (last updated Nov. 8, 2017).
542 For example, the possibility that an individual may have a probabilistic risk for
developing a disease may even force broader reconsiderations of competency
determinations. See generally Jalayne J. Arias, A Time to Step In: Legal Mechanisms for
Protecting Those with Declining Capacity, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 134 (2013) (presenting a
comprehensive overview of competency and clinical capacity determination procedures
while highlighting the gap of legal protections for those within the competencyincompetency gap).
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A. Constitutional Implications
Debates over the proper balance of congressional oversight and judicial
independence with regard to removal of judges are extensive.543 There is
scholarly debate about the extent to which the Constitution permits anything
other than impeachment as a permissible means of judicial discipline.544 Further
analysis beyond the discussion here is warranted, but to guide that analysis, I
offer the following observations.
In relevant part, the Constitution reads:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.545

As others have observed, “the Constitution contains few requirements
regarding the structure of the federal courts,” and “[a]lthough Article III
provides for a Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice of the United States,
nothing else about its structure and its operation is specified, so the size and
composition of the Court is left to Congress.”546
The constitutionality of my proposal depends on where it falls along two
dimensions: (1) Is it required or just recommended? and (2) Will the data
collected remain purely private, or will the data be discoverable and actionable?
Under my proposal, the judge would not have to share their data with
anyone. They might be strongly encouraged to share their data with the Chief
Judge under certain conditions, but they could not be compelled to do so. This
is not to say that there are not constitutional concerns that need further
attention—it is simply to point out that the system can be designed in ways that
are less (or more) offensive to judicial independence.
There is also a state-level constitutional question of a different sort: Would
the introduction of individual-level judicial cognitive assessment tools lead to
543 Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial Independence and Social Welfare, 112 MICH. L. REV.

575, 577 (2014) (“Judicial independence is a cornerstone of American constitutionalism, and
it has long been a source of controversy.”). For a bibliography on point, see Amy B. Atchison
et al., Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability: A Selected Bibliography, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 723, 750–62 (1999).
544 Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional
Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 223 (1993) (“A number of commentators assert that the
arguments demonstrating the exclusivity of impeachment as a political device for judicial
discipline exclude any possibility of judicial discipline through judiciary-dependent devices
such as prosecution or judicial self-regulation.”).
545 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
546 ELIZABETH B. BAZAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31340, CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORITY OVER THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (2005).
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the conclusion that, even under a rational basis test, state mandatory judicial
retirement ages are a violation of the Equal Protection Clause?547
Additional analysis would be required, but in brief, it is interesting to
consider that Judge Theile (the Michigan judge who in 2018 challenged the
Michigan judicial retirement age statute on Equal Protection grounds) argued
that the law should not survive a rational basis test because rational,
nondiscriminatory options are available: “Legislature, judicial tenure
commission and/or the Michigan Supreme Court can make laws, rules or
administrative orders requiring judges and judicial candidates to pass certain
mental and physical capability tests. The Michigan State Court Administrator
could develop performance evaluations similar to those in the private sector.”548
Theile’s excellent argument anticipated the proposal made in this Article.

B. Feasibility
A judicial capacity screening tool sounds appealing in theory. But to move
from theory to an actual toolbox requires a lot of work and the resolution of
many difficult challenges. Beyond the scope of the Article, but necessary too,
would be consideration of the layers of politics surrounding judicial regulation.
The politics are so problematic that one scholar of judicial mandatory retirement
is resigned to the fact that no reform will ever happen:
[T]he . . . likely course is that five decades hence, some future scholar will
[add] . . . another half-dozen mentally decrepit justices to the sad and poignant
roster our history already offers of jurists who harmed their Court and hurt their
own reputations by remaining on the bench too long. 549

Must we resign ourselves to such a dismal future?
The political feasibility rests on a decoupling of assessments of cognitive
capacity from political impetus to shape the courts based on ideology. Such
decoupling should happen under my proposal, given the emphasis on complete
privacy for the medical records. Moreover, the mandated assessments could be
implemented only for new judges with current judges having the option to opt
in or not. This would alleviate the concern that whichever political party has
power when the program is implemented would gain a large number of new
judgeships.
To be sure, ensuring complete privacy—without even judicial councils or
chief judges aware of individual judge capacity assessments—ultimately relies
upon the judge themselves to make an appropriate decision about when to
547 See generally Nina A. Kohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Age Discrimination:
A Challenge to a Decades-Old Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 213 (2010) (detailing
debates among courts regarding whether age discrimination is covered under rational basis
review).
548 “Corrected” Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 343, at *28–29.
549 Garrow, supra note 245, at 1087.

2020]

AGING JUDGES

311

retire.550 That is, under my proposed system, even if a doctor recommends that
a judge retire due to cognitive impairment, the judge could ignore that advice.
It is an untested assumption, but I believe a plausible one, that judges will do
the right thing if those judges are provided regular cognitive assessment data.
I am optimistic that, despite the many acknowledged challenges, there is a
path forward for the successful development of a judicial capacity assessment
toolbox. It would surely require a working group to carefully review relevant
findings in law, medicine, and science. But such committees are organized
regularly, and funding might be available from a variety of sources.551
There is already momentum in the policy sphere. In September 2018,
Representative Darrell Issa (R-OH) proposed the Judiciary Reforms,
Organization and Operational Modernization Act of 2018.552 In the Act, Rep.
Issa proposed regular medical exams for all federal judges:
SEC. 203. MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS FOR FEDERAL JUDGES.
(a) IN GENERAL. Chapter 21 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
§ 464. Medical examinations for justices and judges
(a) IN GENERAL.—Each justice or judge of the United States shall, at no
expense to the judge or justice, undergo a medical examination by a
physician—
(1) in the case of a judge or justice who is 70 years of age or younger,
every 5 years;
(2) in the case of a judge or justice who is older than 70 years of age and
younger than 81 years of age, every 2 years; and
(3) in the case of a judge or justice who is 81 years of age or older, every
year.
(b) CONFIDENTIALITY.—Except as provided in subsection (c), the results of a
medical examination described in subsection (a) shall be confidential.
(c) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case that
a physician conducting a medical examination described in subsection (a)
identifies a condition that may impact the ability of the judge or justice to
carry out the duties of judge or justice’s position, the physician shall
submit such finding to the appropriate chief judge or justice. In the case
that the condition described in the previous sentence relates to a chief

550 See Mark Sherman, Federal Judges Have a Way to Make Investigations Disappear,

ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 10, 2019), https://apnews.com/c593d922bf264cb683ff89a87
aad5a14 [https://perma.cc/9QU7-YVZV] (highlighting that investigations into judicial
conduct disappear with retirement).
551 E.g., James C. Duff, The Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working Group, AM.
B. ASS’N (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges
_journal/2018/fall/the-federal-judiciary-workplace-conduct-working-group/ [https://per
ma.cc/PV3W-QEGV] (providing an example of a judicial working group).
552 H.R. 6755, 115th Cong. (2018).

312

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:2

judge, the physician shall submit the finding to the chief judge of the court
with appellate jurisdiction over the court on which the judge sits.553

Rep. Issa’s bill, although it did not advance out of the Committee on the
Judiciary,554 is indicative of congressional interest in pursuing new solutions for
screening older judges. My primary critiques of the bill are that it provides no
definition of “medical examination,” does not collect baseline data at
nomination, and is too vague in section 3(c) as to when a physician must submit
his health findings.555 The ambiguity is in the phrase “a condition that may
impact the ability of the judge.”556 There is no timeline suggested, e.g., may
impact ability in the next month, the next five years, etc.557 But, critiques aside,
the fact that congressional time is already being spent on this issue speaks to its
importance.
At the state level, there is activity of a different sort suggesting there would
be interest in this toolbox. Many states already offer Lawyer and Judge
Assistance Programs through their state bar associations.558 These programs
often offer confidential support regarding personal problems like substance
abuse and/or mental health.559 Such programs are in place in Arizona,560
Hawaii,561 Indiana,562 Louisiana,563 Michigan,564 Mississippi,565 New

553 Id. § 203 (emphasis in original).
554 See Bills in the 115th Congress: H.R. 6755, C-SPAN, https://www.c-span.org/

congress/bills/bill/?115/hr6755 [https://perma.cc/9S47-T9GB].
555 H.R. 6755 § 203.
556 Id.
557 See id.
558 See infra notes 559–78.
559 Id.
560 Member Assistance Program, ST. B. ARIZ., https://www.azbar.org/professional
development/map/ [https://perma.cc/8V5P-BXJQ].
561 The Attorneys and Judges Assistance Program, HAW. ATT’Y ASSISTANCE PROGRAM,
https://hawaiiaap.com/ [https://perma.cc/9JX2-MVRC].
562 Indiana Judges and Lawyer Assistance Program, IND. LAW., https://www.the
indianalawyer.com/topics/2339-judges-lawyers-assistance-program [https://perma.cc
/23Q4-5RHK].
563 How Can the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program Help You?, LA. JUDGES &
LAW. ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, INC., http://louisianajlap.com/ [https://perma.cc/RQ6GRXNR].
564 Lawyers and Judges Assistance Program, ST. B. MICH., https://www.mich
bar.org/generalinfo/ljap/home [https://perma.cc/TWB9-7XJJ].
565 Lawyers & Judges Assistance Program, MISS. B., https://www.msbar.org/
programs-affiliates/lawyers-judges-assistance-program.aspx [https://perma.cc/VA7Y
-V3QE].
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Jersey,566 New Mexico,567 New York,568 and Pennsylvania.569 Notably, the
Louisiana Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program specifically mentions aging
and age-related dementia as an impairment that judges and lawyers should
consider.570 The Program aims to “reach the aging lawyer before their condition
becomes a discipline issue[.]”571 The State Bar of Michigan also provides
resources related to aging on their website,572 as does Indiana573 and
Arkansas.574 Although most of these programs focus at present only on aging
lawyers, they provide a foundation on which to reach out to judges as well.575
One Pennsylvania program, a judge-specific subset of Lawyers Concerned
for Lawyers (aptly called Judges Concerned for Judges, JCJ), provides
confidential support and resources for judges struggling with a variety of
ailments, but mostly focuses on mental disorders (anxiety, bipolar disorder,
depression, eating disorders) and addiction (drugs, alcohol, gambling).576 JCJ
offers a “peer assistance program” to “restore the health and professional
competence” of judges through “confidential helpline services, volunteer
support and education.”577 JCJ offers education, referral to a medical provider
for a consultation, personalized treatment plans, and peer support for judges who
seek their assistance.578 A legal culture that already recognizes the need for
improved mental health should be open to a conversation about the toolbox I
propose in this Article.

566 N.J. JUDGE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, http://judgesassistance.org/ [https://perma.cc/
4J5N-BUXK].
567 New Mexico Lawyers and Judges Assistance Program, ST. B. N.M., https://
www.nmbar.org/Nmstatebar/For_Members/Lawyers_Judges_Assistance/Lawyers_Ju
dges_Assistance.aspx [https://perma.cc/93YA-N7U8].
568 Gerald Lebovits, Judicial Wellness: The Ups and Downs of Sitting New York Judges,
89 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 10, 19 (2017).
569 Help for a Judge, LAW. CONCERNED FOR LAW. PA., https://www.lclpa.org/
services/help-for-a-judge/ [https://perma.cc/2SAZ-YVL7].
570 Aging in the Legal Profession, LA. JUDGES & LAW. ASSISTANCE PROGRAM,
http://louisianajlap.com/issues-concerns/aging/ [https://perma.cc/5RVX-UQEN].
571 Id.
572 Lawyers & Judges Assistance Program Resources, ST. B. MICH., https://www
.michbar.org/generalinfo/ljap/resources [https://perma.cc/MR7Z-R87N].
573 About JLAP, IND. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.in.gov/judiciary/ijlap/2361.htm
[https://perma.cc/E4UM-C6LF].
574 Aging Issues, ARK. JUDGES & LAW. ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, https://arjlap.org/agingissues/ [https://perma.cc/KPS3-YD35].
575 See, e.g., Aging Lawyers/Lawyers in Transition, ST. B. GA., https://www.gabar.org/
wellness/mental/aging_lawyers.cfm [https://perma.cc/KB3Z-42NP].
576 Confidential Services, Support & Information, JUDGES CONCERNED FOR JUDGES PA.,
https://www.jcjpa.org/ [https://perma.cc/55E7-2QLW].
577 About Us, JUDGES CONCERNED FOR JUDGES PA., https://www.jcjpa.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/DTD4-DK3C].
578 Services, JUDGES CONCERNED FOR JUDGES PA., https://www.jcjpa.org/services/
[https://perma.cc/D5BJ-2GTB].
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C. Legitimacy
A system of aging judges raises not only substantive concerns but concerns
about perception as well. Amidst concerns about judges’ brain health, it could
be the case that the public will be reassured knowing that judges undergo regular
brain health checkups. In a separate set of studies, I have started to pilot some
empirical work to test this proposition.579
I ran experiments looking at public confidence in the functional capacity of
(1) a judge and (2) a law professor at ages fifty-two, sixty-two, seventy-two,
eighty-two, ninety-two, and one-hundred and two. I also examined how the
introduction of cognitive health data affects subjects’ legitimacy ratings. The
bottom line of the results are: (1) the public is slightly more confident in older
academics than they are in older judges, but; (2) even at baseline for judges there
is great confidence in seventy-five-year-old judges, and; (3) for judges and
academics, healthy cognitive testing leads to high levels of confidence
regardless of age.

VII. CONCLUSION
America is getting older, and so too are its judges. At present, most
commentators on the topic of aging judges have expressed concern and made
proposals for mandatory retirement or term limits. This Article has advocated
for a different approach: empowering aging judges through the implementation
of private, individual cognitive health assessments. If carefully developed
through interdisciplinary collaboration, advances in the neuroscience of aging
and dementia can provide to our nation’s judges actionable information about
their brain health. System-wide data collection as proposed here will require
careful study and design before implementation, but it has the transformative
potential to improve the efficiency and legitimacy of the judicial branch.

579 Data and preliminary studies on file with author.

